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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
4	Case No. 12-12020-mg	
5	x	
6	In the Matter of:	
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8	RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC, et al.,	
9		
10	Debtors.	
11		
12	x	
13		
14	United States Bankruptcy Court	
15	One Bowling Green	
16	New York, New York	
17		
18	June 18, 2014	
19	10:04 AM	
20		
21	BEFORE:	
22	HON. MARTIN GLENN	
23 24	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
25		
<b>∠</b> 5		
	eScribers, LLC   (973) 406-2250	
J		- 1

1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6536) Third Interim and Final Application of Ernst & Young LLP for Allowance and Payment of Compensation for 3 4 Professional Services and Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses for Ernst & Young LLP, Other Professional. 5 6 7 (CC: Doc. no. 6512) Final Application of Bryan Cave LLP as 8 Ordinary Course Counsel for the Debtors for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the Period May 1, 2013 9 10 through June 30, 2013 for Bryan Cave LLP, Other Professional. 11 12 (CC: Doc. no. 6537) Final Application of Bradley Arant Boult 13 Cummings LLP as Special Litigation and Compliance Counsel for 14 the Debtors, for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the Period May 14, 2012 Through and Including 15 December 17, 2013 for Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Special 16 17 Counsel. 18 (CC: Doc. no. 6531) Final Fee Application of Deloitte & Touche 19 20 LLP for Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 21 Expenses as Independent Auditor and Attest Service Provider to 22 the Debtors for the Period from May 14, 2012 through August 31, 2013 for Deloitte & Touche LLP, Auditor. 23 24

1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6528) Fourth and Final Fee Application of Towers Watson Delaware Inc. as Human Resources Consultant for the 3 4 Debtors for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the Period June 25, 2012 through April 30, 2013 for Towers 5 6 Watson Delaware Inc., Consultant. 7 8 (CC: Doc. No. 6542) Fifth Interim and Final Fee Application of KPMG LLP, as Tax Compliance Professionals and Information 9 10 Technology Advisors to the Debtors and Debtors in Possession, 11 for Interim Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of 12 Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred from September 1, 2013 13 through December 17, 2013 and for Final Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and 14 15 Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred from May 14, 2012 through December 17, 2013 for KPMG LLP, Other 16 17 Professional. 18 (CC: Doc. no. 6541) Final Fee Application of Prince Lobel Tye 19 LLP for an Award of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses 20 21 for Services Rendered as an Ordinary Course Professional for 22 the Debtors for the Period of May 14, 2012 through December 17, 2013 for Prince Lobel Tye LLP, Other Professional. 23

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1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6539) Fifth Interim and Final Fee Application of Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Special Securitization and 3 4 Investigatory Counsel for the Debtors for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the Period from May 14, 5 2012 through December 17, 2013 for Dorsey and Whitney LLP, 6 7 Special Counsel. 8 9 (CC: Doc. no. 6543) Fifth and Final Application of Carpenter 10 Lipps & Leland LLP as Special Litigation Counsel for the 11 Debtors for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred 12 for the Interim Period of September 1, 2013 Through December 17, 2013 and the Final Period of May 14, 2012 Through December 13 14 17, 2013 for Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP, Special Counsel. 15 16 (CC: Doc. no. 6549) Second and Final Fee Application of 17 Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC as Administrative Agent for 18 the Debtors for Allowance of Compensation for Professional 19 Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred from May 14, 2012 through December 17, 2013 20 21 for Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC, Other Professional. 22 23

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1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6550, 6972) Fifth Interim Fee Application and Final Fee Application of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, as 3 4 Special Securitization Transactional and Litigation Counsel for the Debtors, for Allowance of Compensation for Professional 5 Services Rendered and For Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary 6 7 Expenses Incurred from May 14, 2012 through December 17, 2013 8 for Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Special Counsel. 9 10 (CC: Doc. no. 6552) Third and Final Application of Perkins Coie 11 LLP as Special Insurance Coverage Counsel to the Debtors for 12 Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for Perkins Coie LLP, Special Counsel. 13 14 15 (CC: Doc. no. 6553) Application for Final Professional 16 Compensation for Locke Lord LLP, Special Counsel. 17 18 (CC: Doc. no. 6555) Final Application of Morrison Cohen LLP for 19 Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered 20 and Expenses Incurred During the Period from May 14, 2012 21 through December 16, 2013 for Morrison Cohen LLP, Other 22 Professional. 23 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6556) Final Fee Application of Tilghman & Co., 3 P.C. as Noticing Agent to Debtor in Connection with the Kessler 4 Settlement Agreement, for Allowance of Compensation for the Period May 14, 2012 through December 17, 2013 for Tilghman & 5 Co., P.C., Other Professional. 6 7 8 (CC: Doc. no. 6559) Fourth and Final Application of SilvermanAcampora LLP, Special Counsel to Official Committee of 9 10 Unsecured Creditors, for Allowance of Compensation for 11 Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual 12 and Necessary Incurred from September 1, 2013 through December 13 16, 2013 for SilvermanAcampora LLP, Special Counsel. 14 15 (CC: Doc. no. 5844) Final Fee Application of Leonard, Street 16 and Deinard Professional Association for Allowance of 17 Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 18 Expenses Incurred as Special Minnesota Counsel for the Examiner 19 for Leonard, Street and Deinard Professional Association, Other 20 Professional. 21 22 23 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc. No. 5846) Final Fee Application of Wolf Haldenstein 3 Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, Conflicts Counsel to the Examiner, 4 for Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses for the Period from October 15, 2012 Through and Including April 5 30, 2013. 6 7 8 (CC: Doc. no. 5819) Third Interim and Final Application of Pepper Hamilton LLP as Special Foreclosure Review Counsel for 9 10 Bankruptcy Issues for the Debtors for Compensation and 11 Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the Period May 15, 2012 12 through October 31, 2013. 13 14 (CC: Doc. no. 5850) Final Application of Arthur J. Gonzalez, as 15 Chapter 11 Examiner, for Allowance of Compensation and 16 Reimbursement of Expenses. 17 18 (CC: Doc. No. 5980) Third Interim and Final Application of 19 Hudson Cook, LLP as Special Counsel to the Debtors for 20 Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the 21 Period May 15, 2012 through June 30, 2013. 22 23 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6560) Final Application for Final Professional Compensation for an Award of Compensation and Reimbursement of 3 4 Expenses for Services Rendered as an Ordinary Course Professional for the Debtors for the Period of May 14, 2012 5 6 through December 17, 2013 for Troutman Sanders LLP, Other 7 Professional. 8 CC: Doc. no. 6561) Fifth and Final Application of Severson & 9 10 Werson and for Donald H. Cram, Special Counsel. 11 12 (CC: Doc. no. 6567) Fifth Interim and Final Fee Application of Morrison & Foerster LLP as Bankruptcy Counsel for the Debtors 13 for Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services 14 15 Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred from May 14, 2012 through December 17, 2013 for 16 17 Morrison & Foerster LLP, Debtor's Attorney. 18 19 (CC: Doc. no. 6573) Fifth Interim and Final Application of 20 Centerview Partners LLC as Investment Banker for the Debtors 21 for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the 22 Period May 14, 2012 through December 17, 2013 for Centerview 23 Partners LLC. 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6565) Fourth and Final Fee Application of Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP for Compensation for Services 3 4 Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses as Co-Counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for the (I) Fourth 5 6 Interim Compensation Period of September 1, 2013 Through 7 December 17, 2013 and (II) Final Compensation Period From 8 September 19, 2012 Through December 17, 2013 for Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP, Creditor Comm. Aty. 9 10 11 (CC: Doc. no. 6571) Fifth Interim and Final Application of 12 Mercer (US) Inc. as Compensation Consultant to the Debtors for the Interim Period from September 1, 2013 through December 17, 13 2013 and for the Final Period of May 14, 2012 through December 14 15 17, 2013 for Mercer (US) Inc., Other Professional. 16 17 (CC: Doc# 6562) First and Final Application for Professional 18 Compensation of Weir & Partners LLP. 19 20 (CC: Doc. no. 6577) Amended Final Application of Chadbourne & 21 Parke LLP, Counsel to the Examiner, for Allowance of 22 Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses for Chadbourne & Parke LLP, Other Professional. 23 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6696, CC: 6570, 7002) Fifth and Final Fee Application of Fortace LLC as Consultant for the Debtors for 3 4 Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred from July 6, 2012 through December 17, 2013 for Fortace LLC, Consultant. 5 6 7 (CC: Doc. no. 6569) Application for Final Professional 8 Compensation (First and Final) for Carter Ledyard & Milburn 9 LLP, Consultant. 10 11 (CC: Doc. No. 6578) Fifth and Final Fee Application of Mesirow 12 Financial Consulting, LLC For Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Financial Advisor to the Examiner for the Period 13 July 24, 2012 through December 17, 2013 for Mesirow Financial 14 15 Consulting, LLC, Other Professional. 16 17 (CC: Doc. no. 6579) Final Application of Rubenstein Associates, 18 Inc. as Corporate Communications Consultant for the Debtors for 19 Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the Period May 14, 2012 through April 30, 2013 for Rubenstein 20 21 Associates, Inc., Consultant. 22 23 24 25

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2 (CC: Doc# 6580) Compensation /Fifth and Final Fee Application of AlixPartners, LLP, Financial Advisor to the Official 3 4 Committee of Unsecured Creditors, for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred During the Fifth Interim 5 Compensation Period of September 1, 2013 Through December 17, 6 7 2013 and for the Total Compensation Period of May 21, 2012 8 Through December 17, 2013 for AlixPartners, LLP, Other 9 Professional, period: 5/21/2012 to 12/17/2013, 10 fee:\$14718273.53, expenses: \$103,325.70. 11 12 (CC: Doc# 6587) Final Application of J F. Morrow, Consultant to 13 the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, for Final 14 Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered 15 and for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred 16 During the Total Compensation Period of September 5, 2012 Through August 31, 2013 for J F. Morrow, Consultant, period: 17 18 9/5/2012 to 8/31/2013, fee:\$250,060.00, expenses: \$1,345.61. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc# 6586) Fourth and Final Application of Coherent Economics, LLC, as Consultant to the Official Committee of 3 4 Unsecured Creditors for Final Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual 5 6 and Necessary Expenses Incurred During (I) the Fourth Interim 7 Compensation Period of September 1, 2013 Through December 17, 8 2013 and (II) the Total Compensation Period of August 11, 2012 Through December 17, 2013 for Coherent Economics LLC, 9 10 Consultant, period: 8/11/2012 to 12/17/2013, fee:\$1135367.52, 11 expenses: \$15,194.52. 12 13 (CC: Doc# 6585) First and Final Application of Quest Turnaround Advisors, LLC, Consultant to the Official Committee of 14 Unsecured Creditors, for Final Allowance of Compensation for 15 16 Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual 17 and Necessary Expenses Incurred From September 16, 2013 Through 18 December 17, 2013 for Quest Turnaround Advisors, LLC, 19 Consultant, period: 9/16/2013 to 12/17/2013, fee:\$345,646.12, 20 expenses: \$17,614.09. 21 22 23 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc# 6581) Final Fee Application of Analytic Focus, LLC, Consultant to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 3 4 for Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses 5 From August 28, 2012 Through December 17, 2013 for Analytic 6 7 Focus, LLC, Consultant, period: 8/28/2012 to 12/17/2013, 8 fee:\$592,840.25, expenses: \$355.29. 9 10 (CC: Doc# 6584) Third Interim and Final Fee Application of 11 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, as Special Counsel 12 for Certain Regulatory Matters to the Official Committee of 13 Unsecured Creditors of Residential Capital, LLC, et al. for Interim Allowance of Compensation and for the Reimbursement of 14 15 Expenses for Services Rendered During the Period From December 12, 2012 Through December 17, 2013 for Wilmer Cutler Pickering 16 17 Hale and Dorr LLP, Special Counsel, period: 12/12/2012 to 18 12/17/2013, fee:\$831,751.50, expenses: \$3,713.58. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc# 6583) Fifth Interim and Final Application of Moelis & Company LLC for Compensation for Professional Services Rendered 3 4 and Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred as Investment Banker to the Official Committee of Unsecured 5 Creditors for the Period From May 16, 2012 Through December 17, 6 7 2013 for Moelis & Company LLC, Other Professional, period: 5/16/2012 to 12/17/2013, fee:\$14616129.03, expenses: 8 9 \$250,527.01. 10 11 (CC: Doc# 6582) Fourth Interim and Final Application of Epig 12 Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC, as Information Agent for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, for Allowance and 13 Payment of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and 14 for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred for 15 the Interim Period From September 1, 2013 Through December 17, 16 17 2013 and the Final Period From May 22, 2012 Through December 18 17, 2013 for Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC (Claims and 19 Noticing Agent), Other Professional, period: 5/22/2012 to 12/17/2013, fee:\$186,302.06, expenses: \$255,878.82. 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 2 (CC: Doc. no. 6590) Final Fee Application of San Marino Business Partners LLC As Consultant to the Official Committee 3 4 of Unsecured Creditors For Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred For The Period August 11,2012 Through 5 December 17,2013 for San Marino Business Partners LLC, 6 7 Consultant. 8 9 (CC: Doc. no. 6588, PTBS: Doc. no. 7035) Fifth Interim and 10 Final Application of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, 11 as Conflicts Counsel to the Debtors and Debtors in Possession, 12 for Allowance and Payment of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary 13 Expenses Incurred from May 14, 2012 Through and Including 14 15 December 17, 2013 for Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, 16 Debtor's Attorney. 17 18 (CC: Doc. no. 6591, 6632) Fifth Interim and Final Application 19 of FTI Consulting, Inc., as Financial Advisor for the Debtors. 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 2 (CC Doc. no. 6589) Fifth and Final Application of Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, Counsel for the Official Committee of 3 Unsecured Creditors, for Final Allowance of Compensation for 4 5 Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual 6 and Necessary Expenses Incurred During (I) The Fifth Interim 7 Compensation Period of September 1, 2013 Through December 17, 8 2013 And (II) The Total Compensation Period of May 16, 2012 9 Through December 17, 2013 for Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel 10 LLP, Creditor Comm. Aty. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Transcribed by: Penina Wolicki 21 eScribers, LLC 22 700 West 192nd Street, Suite #607 23 New York, NY 10040 24 (973)406-2250 25 operations@escribers.net

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2	ALSO PRESENT:
3	MICHAEL AGRUSA, ESQ., Towers Watson
4	JEFFREY LIPPS, ESQ., Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP
5	STEVEN REISMAN, ESQ., Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt &
6	Mosle, LLP
7	MARYANN GALLAGHER, ESQ., Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt &
8	Mosle, LLP
9	ERIC LOPEZ SCHNABEL, ESQ., Dorsey & Whitney LLP
10	ROBERT J. FEINSTEIN, ESQ., Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones
11	MICHAEL J. RIELA, ESQ., Vedder Price
12	GARY APFEL, Pepper Hamilton LLP
13	JAY R. BENDER, Bradley Arant Soult Cummings LLP
14	EDWARD R. BERGSTROM, San Marino Business Partners, LLC
15	MICHAEL G. BIGGERS, Bryan Cave LLP
16	JEFFREY BRODSKY, Quest Turnaround Advisors
17	DANA CLARKE, Hudson Cook, LLP
18	ADRIAN COWAN, Analytic Focus
19	DONALD H. CRAM, Severson & Werson, APC
20	MINIARD CULPEPPER, Prince Lobel Tye, LLP
21	BRYAN DLUHY, Freeborn & Peters LLP
22	DEVON J. EGGERT, Freeborn & Peters LLP
23	DEBRA FELDER, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP
24	DRAKE D. FOSTER, Kurtzman Carson Consutlants
25	ALAN FRANKEL, Coherent Economics

1	CHRISTIAN HANCOCK, Bradley Arant Soult Cummings LLP
2	ELIZABETH HULSEBOS, Dorsey & Whitney LLP
3	ARNO I. IZUAGLE, Arno I. Izuagle (Pro per)
4	BRIAN KELLY, AlixPartners, LLC
5	MATTHEW D. LEE, Foley & Lardner, LLP
6	JASON MANNING, Troutman Sanders, LLP
7	J.F. MORROW, J.F. Morrow (Pro per)
8	CHETAN NAIR, KPMG LLP
9	FRANK SILLMAN, Fortace, LLC
10	STEVE TILGHMAN, Tilghman & Company
11	TODD WUERTZ, Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC
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## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: All right, please be seated.

We're here in Residential Capital, number 12-12020.

Mr. Marinuzzi?

MR. MARINUZZI: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record, Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Morrison & Foerster on behalf of the reorganized debtors.

Your Honor, we're here today on the final fee and expense requests of the estate professionals. By my count, and by the agenda, there are forty-five applications that are up for final approval, all but four of which are unresolved (sic) and currently unopposed. The four that have some degree of objection are the applications filed by Morrison & Cohen, special counsel to the board; Carter Ledyard, committee special counsel; and the financial advisor and attorneys for the examiner, Mesirow and Chadbourne & Parke.

I'd like to, if I may, Your Honor, walk through the resolution tracking chart, as we've done the prior four times I've been up here. And I have extra copies in case Your Honor needs them.

THE COURT: I have it. And I have it marked. So let me just make sure I find it.

Okay, go ahead, Mr. Marinuzzi.

MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, I'd like to proceed with the ones that are unopposed, and leave till the end of the

hearing those that have some degree of objection, so people in the courtroom and on the phone could go about their business.

THE COURT: Yeah. And when you go through this, there are four professional applications which are among those listed as unopposed, as to which I have issues that are going to have to be discussed. I think because of the large number of applications and the volume of materials that were generated, I think on most of them, I'm satisfied where there's no objection, and I believe that the U.S. Trustee has worked out resolutions on many of those, some it had no objections to at all, we'll be able to go through these pretty quickly. Okay?

Go ahead, Mr. Marinuzzi.

MR. MARINUZZI: Very well, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I'm just going to read the final requested fees and expenses, and not the fifth or third interim, depending upon how many people are up to.

So the first firm if Bradley, Arant, Boult Cummings, and it's docket number 6537, requesting total fees of \$11,959,869.89 and expenses of \$613,918.47. In order to resolve the informal objection of the U.S. Trustee, Bradley Arent has agreed to reduce their final fee request to \$11,456,954.36 and expenses to \$613,321.35.

THE COURT: 25 or 35?

MR. MARINUZZI: I have 35 on my chart.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm sorry. I misheard you.

MR. MARINUZZI: I notice that my eyes have gotten worse since the last time I --

THE COURT: No, I probably -- my years have gotten worse, so I misheard you.

MR. MARINUZZI: Oh, okay.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, Bryan Cave requesting final fees of \$279,187.50, \$116.60 in expenses. No objection to this final application.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, next is Carpenter Lipps & Leland.

THE COURT: Let me just say, as Mr. Marinuzzi is going through these -- we're just going to go through them, but I just -- if someone -- he's identifying these as ones without an objection. If there's someone present in court or on the phone who intends to object to them, please just indicate that you have an objection. We won't get into the substance of it, but I just want to know whether, indeed, these are ones without objection.

Go ahead.

MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, I believe I left off with Carpenter Lipps & Leland, docket number 6543, requesting final fees of \$6,163,315 and final approval of expense reimbursement in the amount of \$2,609,058.89. No objections were filed to

the Carpenter Lipps final fee application. 1 THE COURT: Go ahead. 2 MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Centerview 3 4 Partners, docket number 6573, seeking total fees of 5.7 million dollars, plus 3.8 million dollars in the form of an in-court 5 6 transaction fee, final expenses of \$68,853.16. There was no 7 objection to the requested fees. And to resolve the informal response of the United States Trustee's Office, Centerview has 8 reduced their final fee request to \$67,336 --9 10 THE COURT: Final expense request. 11 MR. MARINUZZI: I'm sorry? 12 THE COURT: Final expense request. 13 MR. MARINUZZI: Final expense request, I'm sorry, Your 14 Honor. 15 THE COURT: I think you said "fee". MR. MARINUZZI: I apologize. To \$67,336.36. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Curtis, Mallet-19 Prevost, Colt & Mosle, docket number 6588, requesting final fees of \$9,957,770.80 and expenses of \$30,505.36. To resolve 20 21 the informal response of the United States Trustee, they've 22 reduced their fee request to \$9,847,770.80 and there was no 23 objection to the expense request. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Deloitte &

Touche, docket number 6531, requesting final fees in the amount of \$5,497,620.65. No expenses, Your Honor, requested, and no objection to the application.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is the application of Dorsey & Whitney, docket number 6539, requesting fees in the amount of \$812,063.65 and expenses of \$5,480.03. No objection to the final application.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, Ernst & Young, docket number 6536, requesting final fees of \$1,886,517.75 and expenses of \$43,285.29. Ernst & Young reduced their fees and expenses to accommodate the U.S. Trustee's concerns and are seeking final approval of \$1,884,808.75 and expenses of \$43,230.48. No objection other than the U.S. Trustee's.

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, next is Fortace LLC, docket number 6696 requesting final fees of \$2,222,459.50 and expenses of \$659,745.97. No objection.

Next, Your Honor, is FTI Consulting, docket number 6591, seeking final fees in the amount of \$32,491,560.75 and final expenses of \$920,158.65. In order to resolve the U.S. Trustee's objection, the fee request has been reduced to 32 thousand --

THE COURT: 32 million.

MR. MARINUZZI: I'm sorry, \$32,365,687.27 and the 1 2 expense amount -- and there's an error in the chart, Your Honor -- is \$908,878.38 -- not 43 cents, 38 cents. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is --5 6 THE COURT: Hang on, Mr. Marinuzzi. 7 MR. MARINUZZI: I'm sorry. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, may I have a moment 8 9 with Mr. Marinuzzi? 10 THE COURT: Yes. MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, I have an updated number 11 from FTI. I apologize. The final amount of fees is 12 13 \$32,364,884.11 and the expenses -- the chart is correct -- it's \$908,878.43. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. MARINUZZI: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 17 That brings us to Hudson Cook, docket number 5980, seeking total fees in the amount of \$2,284,737.50, and expenses 18 19 of \$30,550.67. The objection by the U.S. Trustee was withdrawn. 20 21 THE COURT: Go ahead. 22 MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is KPMG, LLP, docket 23 number 6542, requesting fees in the amount of \$1,791,439.65 and 24 expenses in the amount of \$102,515.04. There was no objection 25 to the application.

THE COURT: All right. 1 MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Kurtzman Carson 2 3 Consultants, docket number 6549, requesting fees for the final period in the amount of \$212,440.50. No objection. 4 5 Next, Your Honor, is Locke Lord, docket number 6553, requesting final fees in the amount of \$1,222,388.78 and final 6 7 approval of expenses in the amount of \$22,716.90. No 8 objections. 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Mercer (US) Inc., seeking final fees of \$317,003.56 and expenses of \$45,041.90. 11 12 THE COURT: Just bear with me one second, please. 13 (Pause) 14 THE COURT: Go ahead. 15 MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, Mercer has reduced their 16 fee request to \$311,434.94 and their expense request to 17 \$44,731.65, in light of the informal response from the U.S. 18 Trustee. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, we'll skip over Morrison & 21 Cohen, since there's an unresolved objection. 22 THE COURT: Right. MR. MARINUZZI: And next is Morrison & Foerster, 23 24 docket number 6567 requesting final fees in the amount of

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\$95,457,127.80 and expenses in the amount of \$3,043,012.82.

The final fee requests reflects a three-million-dollar writedown for the benefit of the liquidating trust to resolve any objections that they might have had.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is the final application of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, docket number 6550, seeking final fees in the amount of \$1,844,9- -- I'm sorry -- \$1.844,902.19 and expenses in the amount of \$4,807.25. Orrick has agreed to reduce its fee request to \$1,833,156.19 and its expense request to \$4,749.95.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Pepper Hamilton, docket number 5819, requesting approval of final fees in the amount of \$5,300,886 and expenses in the amount of \$125,553.64. Pepper Hamilton has agreed to reduce its fee request to \$5,295,708.50 and its expense request to \$124,924.14.

Next, Your Honor, is Perkins Coie, docket number 6552, requesting fees in the amount of \$1,469,618 and expenses in the amount of \$14,725.01. They've agreed to reduce their fee request to \$1,462,384.21 and their expense request to \$13,985.28, to accommodate the concerns of the U.S. Trustee.

THE COURT: And this is one of them that I have additional issues to raise.

MR. MARINUZZI: Would you like to raise them now, Your Honor?

1 THE COURT: No. 2 MR. MARINUZZI: Okay. THE COURT: Let's go on. But we're going to have to 3 4 come back to Perkins Coie. 5 MR. MARINUZZI: Okay. Next, Your Honor, is Prince 6 Lobel Tye, seeking final approval of fees in the amount of 7 \$222,328 and expenses in the amount of \$29,451.34, and no 8 objection was filed with respect to this application. That brings us, Your Honor, to Rubenstein & 9 10 Associates, docket number 6579, seeking final approval of fees 11 in the amount of \$38,276 and expenses of \$9,920.93. No 12 objection was filed. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Severson & 15 Werson, docket number 6561, requesting approval on a final basis of fees in the amount of \$3,321,340.39 and expenses of 16 17 \$297,513.49. They've agreed to reduce their expense request to 18 \$295,040.35 to accommodate the U.S. Trustee's concerns. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is docket number 21 6556, Tilghman & Co., requesting final fees in the amount of 22 \$11,507.50 and expenses of \$29,046.14. No objection was filed with respect to this application. 23 24 THE COURT: All right.

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MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Towers Watson,

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docket number 6528, requesting approval of final fees in the amount of \$175,665.92 and expenses of \$9,550.01. There was no objection. THE COURT: All right. MR. MARINUZZI: Next, Your Honor, is Troutman Sanders, docket number 6560, requesting final approval of fees in the amount of \$1,043,948.96 and expenses in the amount of \$16,823.37. No objection. THE COURT: All right. MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, that brings us to the final uncontested debtor application, that of Weir & Partners, seeking approval of final fees in the amount of \$2,349 and expenses of \$154.68. There was no objection. THE COURT: We're going to have to come back to Weir. MR. MARINUZZI: Okay. Your Honor, that's it for the debtor professionals. I will cede the podium to Mr. Mannal to review with the Court the resolved committee professional applications. THE COURT: Okay. Just give me a second before you start, Mr. Mannal. Go ahead, you can go up there. Thanks, Mr. Marinuzzi. MR. MARINUZZI: You're welcome, Your Honor. you. (Pause) THE COURT: All right, go ahead, Mr. Mannal.

MR. MANNAL: Good morning, Your Honor. Doug Mannal from Kramer Levin on behalf of the creditors' committee.

Your Honor, first, Mr. Eckstein asked that I apologize for his absence today. We are currently representing another debtor in front of Judge Lane, and there are depositions today that required his attendance. Many of the same characters from the ResCap case are in that case, and I think as Your Honor, will not be surprised, that he'd much rather be here today than attending those depositions.

Your Honor, just briefly, looking back over the course of these Chapter 11 cases, Kramer Levin and the other committee professionals are very proud of what we've been able to achieve. Avoiding protracted, lengthy, expensive litigation through a global settlement is truly one of our proudest accomplishments. And we appreciate the opportunity.

From the start, however, committee professionals, have been very mindful of the significant professional fees incurred in these cases. In an effort to avoid any disputes at the conclusion of these cases, many of the committee professionals have agreed to make significant voluntary write-offs, both during the case and as part of the final fee application.

Your Honor, I'm happy to walk through the chart, and I'll do as good a job as Mr. Marinuzzi did, with the committee professionals. Each of the committee professionals has a representative in the courtroom, should the Court have any

1 questions.

AlixPartners, docket 6580, requests final fees of \$14,718,273.53 and final expenses of \$103,325.70. There was an informal objection. It was resolved by the -- informal objection filed by the United States Trustee that was resolved through no changes to the application.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MANNAL: We ask that be approved.

Analytic Focus, docket number 6581, requested final fees in the amount of \$592,840.25 and final expenses of \$355.29. There are no objections to that application.

Carter Ledyard, I think we're going to keep to the end of the --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MANNAL: -- agenda. Coherent Economics, docket 6586, final fees in the amount of \$1,135,367.52 and requested final expenses of \$15,194.52. There were no objections to that application.

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, docket number 6582, final fees in the amount of \$186,302.06 and final expenses requested in the amount of \$255,878.82. The U.S. Trustee filed an objection -- actually, I'm sorry, an informal response was made by the U.S. Trustee, and they've agreed to reduce their fee request to \$184,593.16 and no change to the expenses.

THE COURT: All right, I have some issues with Epiq.

MR. MANNAL: J.F. Morrow, 6587, there were no objections. The requested final fees were \$250,060 and the requested expenses were \$1,345.61. There were no objections.

Kramer Levin, the requested fees were \$65,000,300.55. That reflected approximately a five-million-dollar write-down through monthly and quarterly fees. The expenses requested were \$2,416,309.04. After further discussions with the Liquidating Trust and the United States Trustee, Kramer Levin agreed to a further reduction of its requested fees in the amount of \$634,284.70, making a final fee request of \$64,366,016.25, with no change to the requested expenses.

THE COURT: Hang on just a second. Okay.

MR. MANNAL: Moelis & Co., docket number 6583. There was a requested final fees of \$14,616,129 -- excuse me -- \$14,616,129.03. The requested expenses for that -- for the final fee period is \$250,527.01. There were no objections to the final fees. However, they agreed to reduce their expenses and are now requesting final expenses in the amount of \$249,664.42.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MANNAL: Pachulski Stang, docket number 6565, requesting final fees in the amount of \$4,844,469.07, final expenses in the amount of \$94,832.44. Pachulski has agreed to make further reductions in their fee request, making a final fee request of \$4,843,989.47 and agreed to reduce their

expenses in the amount of a final expense request of \$87,794.29.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MANNAL: Quest Turnaround Advisors, docket number 6585, requested final fees in the amount of \$345,646.12 and requested final expenses of \$17,614.09. There were no objections to that application, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MANNAL: San Marino Business Partners, docket number 6590, in the amount -- fees in the amount of \$236,157.38 and requested expenses of \$11,404.30. There were no objections.

SilvermanAcampora, docket number 6559, requested final fees in the amount of \$1,160,460.25 and requested expenses for the final period of \$15,099.70. There were no objections.

THE COURT: All right I have a couple -- one or two issues to raise on that.

MR. MANNAL: And the last unopposed committee professional is Wilmer Cutler, docket number 6584, requested final fees in the amount of \$831,751.50 and expenses for the final period of \$3,713.58. Wilmer Cutler has agreed to reduce their fee request to \$828,680.50 and there were no objections to that revised number.

THE COURT: And I have issues to raise.

MR. MANNAL: Okay.

1	THE COURT: Thank you.
2	MR. MANNAL: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Seife?
4	MR. SEIFE: Good morning, Your Honor. Howard Seife,
5	Chadbourne & Parke, counsel for the examiner. There is an
6	objection outstanding to Chadbourne & Parke, so we'll defer
7	that.
8	There is no objection to the fee request of Arthur
9	Gonzalez as examiner. He has asked to defer consideration of
10	his application until you've heard the applications of his
11	counsel and his financial advisor, for which there are pending
12	objections.
13	THE COURT: Okay. But the amount being sought is
14	\$568,612.50, correct?
15	MR. SEIFE: That is correct. With no objection.
16	THE COURT: Right. And no expenses?
17	MR. SEIFE: That's correct, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: All right.
19	MR. SEIFE: The next professional of the examiner is
20	Leonard, Street and Deinard. They are seeking fees of
21	\$100,000; requested expenses of \$4,210. There was no
22	objection.
23	Mesirow, as I said, there is an objection, and that'll
24	be taken up later.
25	Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, requested fees

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are $82,997 --
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             THE COURT: Why don't you try just to repeat the --
                         -- 82 thousand --
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             MR. SEIFE:
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             THE COURT:
                         -- say it again. Go ahead.
                         $82,997.85.
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             MR. SEIFE:
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. SEIFE: Expenses of $1,670.56.
             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. SEIFE: And there's no objection.
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             THE COURT: All right. What I'd like to hear from
    next, Mr. Marinuzzi, is from Mr. Masumoto regarding what the
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    U.S. Trustee did with respect to, I guess it's what, the fifth
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    interim application and the final fee applications.
             And Mr. Masumoto, if you would, because I think this
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    is going to come up with respect to the Liquidation Trust's
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    objections, if you could describe generally what the U.S.
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    Trustee did with respect to the first four interim
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    applications, and not to go through on the precise dollar
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    amounts of the resolutions. Because in the first four interim
    professional applications, the U.S. Trustee had either filed an
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    objection or informally dealt with objections to some, not all,
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    of the professionals' fees. And the Court likewise had
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    additional issues that the Court raised with respect to those
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    interim applications.
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             I'd just say, as I've repeated multiple times in
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connection with the prior interim applications, and it's true of this interim, the last interim, and the final, the Court, my law clerks, and interns, have spent a great deal of time reviewing fee applications. Needless to say, there's a large volume of materials for today, and there has been at each of the interim applications.

And generally, when -- I've been mindful, when the U.S. Trustee has reached a resolution of its objections with professionals, it has generally resulted in a bottom line or lump-sum figure by which applications were reduced. And where the Court felt that the proposed resolution reached by the U.S. Trustee sufficiently dealt with any issues the Court might have, I didn't want to -- I may have used this term -- doubleding professionals by tacking on the additional reduction that I felt was on an issue that I had and that the U.S. Trustee had raised and had reached a resolution.

That becomes very much on the table today in light of many, many of the Liquidating Trust's objections to professional fees for the first four interim periods. I have a very strong feeling, to which you'll gather I'm reacting very negatively, they're trying to retrade things that were resolved before. But I think it would be helpful, Mr. Masumoto, and people could go back to the transcripts -- I've been generally very complimentary of you and your colleagues. It's an enormous task on your office to review fee applications, and in

this case in particular. And you've done a stellar job.

So but I think it would be helpful to my consideration today of the final approval of the fee applications that are before me and the remaining objections to fee applications that I have to resolve. Go ahead, Mr. Masumoto.

MR. MASUMOTO: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning, Your Honor. Brian Masumoto for the Office of the United States
Trustee.

Your Honor, as indicated, we reviewed the fifth interim period for review at this time together with the fees on a final basis, and we did focus our review primarily on the fifth interim period. We did not revisit our review of the prior four interim periods specifically, except for purposes of context or sort of historical information.

With respect to this interim, because there was sufficient time prior to the filing of the objection date, after reviewing the fifth interim, we did contact the parties prior to filing our objections. In the past, given the short amount of time we had to prepare our review and objection, we filed an objection with the matters unresolved. In this case, we did make an effort to try to address the parties.

But having said that, we attempted to, in our pleading, list the areas that were resolved. So if we resolved a matter, say, for example, on the application preparation time or transitory timekeepers, those matters that were addressed as

part of the overall settlement were reflected in our pleadings.

And to that extent -- and generally, there was a separation

between resolutions for fees and expenses. And that's how we treated them.

Now, unfortunately, although from our purposes, in terms of settlement, we did allocate different amounts on different issues, indicating to the parties the strength we felt in particular issues. That allocation, obviously, wasn't necessarily agreed to by all the parties. And thus, the overall settlement, leaving to the parties, their allocation with respect to the expenses -- I'm sorry, with respect to the objections.

So having said that, the pleadings that we did file, although listing the areas of coverage, provide no allocation as to the different topics. And there's only an overall amount. And as indicated, we did not revisit any of the earlier interim periods for purposes of filing.

During the final period, there were also additional considerations that didn't apply to the earlier period, which was that there were substantial reductions that were achieved by some of the parties with the Liquidating Trust. And that played a factor in our analysis.

As Your Honor may or may not know, for many of the -not many, but for certain of the large applicants, our office
had requested electronic data. In fact -- I guess we refer to

it as LEDES data, which is what's also being required under the new revised U.S. Trustee Guidelines. And they were very helpful for our purposes of analyzing the very large fee applications, particularly by Morrison & Foerster and Kramer Levin.

So we, in utilizing those tools, we did analyze the fee applications. But as I mentioned in the fifth interim, given the very large reductions, that was taken into account in terms of -- the objections that we would have to uncover would have to exceed the voluntary reductions. And therefore, in this particular instance, particularly with respect to those very large applications by debtor and creditor committee counsel, we determined that the voluntary reductions exceeded any deficiencies that we were able to determine.

THE COURT: Let me just interrupt you to say that I would say that, in effect, I've applied the same methodology from the review by my chambers, namely that where the voluntary reduction or the negotiated reduction exceeded the amounts that the Court has identified as an issue, I've -- I haven't ruled yet, but you'll see that I agree to the final numbers that are presented for approval today without the necessity of going back and revisiting line items or detailed items. And that's true in the bulk of the applications, where I've satisfied myself that the resolutions that were reached by your office or by the Liquidating Trust, more than sufficiently account for

any issues that I would otherwise raise or adjustments I would otherwise make.

because of the large number of applications today, I'm not going to go through each of those and say, well, there was this issue or that issue, but I'm satisfied. But in my own review and analysis, I've done that. I've gone through and satisfied myself that the specific request for the fifth interim period or -- and I'll come back to the issue of final fee applications in a little while -- but I've tried to take into consideration, do I feel that the numbers that are being sought, subject to the reductions either achieved by your office or the Liquidating Trust, are reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances. And I, in large measure, concluded they are.

Go ahead, Mr. Masumoto.

MR. MASUMOTO: Thank you. Your Honor, and I don't have very much more to say, except, Your Honor, I believe that we attempted to and did achieve resolutions with most of the applicants. I believe from the U.S. Trustee's standpoint, we just have one applicant with one issue that remained unresolved, and we thought it was a matter for the Court to adjudicate.

THE COURT: That's the Carter Ledyard?

MR. MASUMOTO: That's correct, Your Honor.

And with respect to the other matters that have not

been resolved with the Liquidating Trust, I believe that would be Chadbourne and Mesirow, we did reach our own accommodations with respect to those applicants with respect to the fifth interim period. Because those two applicants, although technically filed finals on the fourth, did have additional time which they included as part of a supplemental filing. So we did also review those and reached accommodations with those individuals.

THE COURT: So to be clear, with respect to the Chadbourne and Mesirow applications, for the amounts listed in the chart that's before me for Chadbourne on final fees of \$46,860,806.66, that reflects -- that number reflects your office's resolution of any amounts of fees that Chadbourne is seeking. Is that correct?

MR. MASUMOTO: Yes, it does, Your Honor. I believe with respect to the fifth interim, they had agreed to a 30,000-dollar reduction, with respect to that -- just this fifth interim period.

THE COURT: And as to the amount of the expenses that Chadbourne, is seeking --

MR. MASUMOTO: We had no --

THE COURT: -- you had no objection to that --

MR. MASUMOTO: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- the final figure.

MR. MASUMOTO: Correct.

1 THE COURT: And --2 MR. MASUMOTO: And similarly, with respect to 3 Mesirow --4 THE COURT: So just -- but just to get the number on the table. The amount of expenses that Chadbourne is seeking, 5 as to which -- on a final basis, as to which you have no 6 7 objection -- it's for the final period -- \$2,995,419.47. 8 Correct? MR. MASUMOTO: I believe that's correct, Your Honor. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. All right. And as to Mesirow? MR. MASUMOTO: As to Mesirow, they agreed, again, with 11 12 respect to the fifth interim period, to a reduction of 20,000 13 dollars. And we had no objection to their expenses for that 14 fifth interim period. 15 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MASUMOTO: So that one, I believe, with respect to 16 17 their fees for the final period, it's \$39,492,705, and with 18 respect to expenses, it's 344,747. 19 THE COURT: It would be useful to me, Mr. Masumoto, if you could just talk a little bit about the first four interim 20 21 applications with respect to the process that you and your 22 office followed in reviewing and resolving -- or proposed resolutions of objections to professional fees and expenses. 23 MR. MASUMOTO: Yes, Your Honor. If I might, I did 24

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prepare a little bit of a chart reflecting some of the earlier

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fee applications. If I might approach?

THE COURT: Yeah, please; please.

MR. MASUMOTO: My apologies. There's something on the reverse side.

THE COURT: That's okay. I print on both sides too, to save paper.

Go ahead.

MR. MASUMOTO: Your Honor, the chart really sets forth actually with respect to the three disputed parties, Morrison & Cohen, Chadbourne, and Mesirow, the interim -- first, second, third, fourth and fifth interim periods. My apologies, the fifth spilled over on the last page and it's missing the header. If you fold it up, you can get the header. But the first two columns are the interim.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MASUMOTO: The next two set would be the final fees, and then third set of -- well, the three remaining columns are the -- reflects the resolution.

The final column on the right reflects the objections that were raised with respect to the various interim periods. So as you can see, during the first interim period, say, for example, with Morrison & Cohen, we raised transitory timekeeper, multiple attendee and transportation and meal objections. And similarly, for each of the three professionals, in that column, you will see the areas that gave

rise to objections, and ultimately resolutions for the parties. So that's -- in terms of our review, we obviously looked at the Court's guidelines, and your Court's rulings on various fees and expenses, and applied them through our analysis. And we did that through all of the periods.

Once again, I believe that for each period, we treated it as a discrete period without any sort of carry-over. We did raise a possible concern, because there's a lot of contention with respect to the fee application preparation issue. Many firms argue fluctuation in billing, and sometimes there's spillover amounts in different periods. So however -- it's been this Court's practice to teach each interim as a separate period, and we've attempted to apply that for each interim period on each of these discrete issues.

So again, with respect to all of the interim periods, we've reviewed it under our typical criteria. And where there were problems or issues, we raised them as part of our objection.

I think we -- I believe the first interim we may have attempted to try to reach informal resolutions. But generally, for the succeeding interim periods, there was really insufficient time between the filing of the fee applications and the time to file our objections, that we didn't have time to really negotiate prior to filing the objections. We did negotiate generally after the objections were filed and up

until the hearing. We spent a considerable amount of time resolving the disputes, and I believe that in many cases, prior to the hearing, reached resolutions with most of the parties.

THE COURT: The other issue I'd be interested to know whether your office has a policy with respect to it. So Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the standard for compensation of professionals. And it really -- it doesn't really distinguish between interim and final. Section 331 deals with the interim fees. And I don't think anybody disputes that where a court approves fees and expenses on an interim basis, there's no absolute preclusion principle that would keep a court from reviewing each of the fees and expenses at a final fee hearing. There's very little case law, actually, that I've found on it.

It's usually been in instances where a court, at a final fee hearing, has revisited things that were resolved earlier where a debtor is either administratively insolvent or where allegations of breach of fiduciary duty or malpractice or something of that nature has arisen.

Does your office have a policy with respect to what issues regarding fees and expenses should be raised at a final hearing, where fees were reviewed by the court, reviewed by your office and resolved at interim hearings?

MR. MASUMOTO: Your Honor, I don't think we have a specific or concrete rule. I do believe it's facts and

circumstances. I think there's a tension between the requirement that the fees that are -- or the services performed should be looked at in terms of reasonableness at the period which they were performed.

THE COURT: At the time that they were performed.

MR. MASUMOTO: Right. And there may be circumstances where that perspective may be distorted, and perhaps a final review may result in a revisiting of that perspective.

But given the mandate that the fees should be examined at the time performed, we do believe that the interim review has -- should have a great deal of weight, and that it should not be totally ignored for final review purposes.

There are circumstances in which perhaps sometimes you are too close to the case or you don't see the overall picture at the time that services are being performed, and that particular perspective may create a certain consideration at the final review. But it's not the practice to re-review in exhaustive detail all of the things that were examined at the interim. For example, if we had gone through a fee application and noted lumping and vagueness, we wouldn't revisit that review and do it all over again for the final review.

I believe for final purposes, sometimes there's certain strategic considerations that may not have been evident or considered at the time the interims were considered. And those considerations may have an impact for purposes of the

final review. But I believe it is our practice that the review we do at an interim should not, in fact, be ignored, and in fact, should carry significant weight in determining at the final, what should be reconsidered.

I do understand that there are some concerns, and I think it was alluded to in Your Honor's question, because we settle on a global basis, and the parties don't fix an allocation among the different results, it may become different when you're looking at the final review on a particular issue, as to what adjustments were really attributable to that particular problem.

I will concede that difficulty. But in my mind, that should be taken into consideration, and once again, not entirely ignored. But I don't have a solution, because I cannot -- because there was no resolution among the parties to allocate the specific reductions to specific issues.

THE COURT: Nor do I think there has to be.

MR. MASUMOTO: Yes. Nor do we, Your Honor. And that is why in many cases, we're agreeable to an overall settlement. But I do understand that would complicate, from the final perspective, to determine what adjustments were attributable to specific objections that have been raised.

THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Masumoto.

MR. MASUMOTO: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What I'd like to do, so that many parties

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in the court can leave if they wish to, is to go through with respect to those applications that are -- as to which there are no objections and as to which I don't have a separate issue I want to raise, I'll rule on those now. I don't think I need to hear about -- from anybody else on those. And then anybody who wants to be excused can, and then we'll go on and deal with those as to which there are issues that have to be resolved. So first, with respect to Bradley Arant, final fees in the amount of \$11,456,954.36 and expenses of \$613,321.35 are approved. Is there any reason why -- I don't think I have to go through the fifth interim period, if I'm approving the final That's -- obviously the fifth period is wrapped into fees. that. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Correct. THE COURT: Okay, so that's as to Bradley Arant. As to Bryan Cave, final fees of \$279,187.50 and expenses of \$116.60 are approved. As to Carpenter Lipps, final fees of \$6,163,315 and expenses of \$2,609,058.89, is approved. And if I misspeak, Mr. Marinuzzi will call me on that.

MR. MARINUZZI: I will, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Centerview Partners, LLC, final fees,

expenses of \$67,336.36, are approved.

\$5,700,000 as the fees and \$3,800,000 as the transaction fee,

1	As to Curtis Mallet, fees of \$9,847,770.80 and
2	expenses of \$30,505.36, are approved.
3	As to Deloitte, fees of \$5,497,620.65 and no expenses,
4	are approved.
5	As to Dorsey Whitney, fees of \$812,063.65 and expenses
6	of \$5,480.03, are approved.
7	As to Ernst & Young, fees of \$1,884,808.75 and
8	expenses of \$43,230.48, are approved.
9	As to Fortace, LLC, fees in the amount of
10	\$2,222,459.50 and expenses of \$659,745.97, are approved.
11	As to FTI Consulting, Inc., fees of \$32,364,884.11 and
12	expenses of \$908,878.43, are approved.
13	As to Hudson Cook, fees of \$2,284,737.50 and expenses
14	of \$30,550.67, are approved.
15	As to KPMG, LLP, fees in the amount of \$1,791,439.65
16	and expenses of \$102,515.04, are approved.
17	As to Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, final fees of
18	\$212,440.50 and no expenses are approved.
19	As to Locke Lord, LLP, fees of \$1,222,388.78 and
20	expenses of \$22,716.90, are approved.
21	As to Mercer (US) Inc., fees of \$311,434.94 and
22	expenses of \$44,731.65, are approved.
23	Morrison & Cohen, we're going to pass on.
24	For Morrison & Foerster, LLP, fees of \$95,457,127.80
25	and expenses of \$3,043,012.82, are approved.

1	As to Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, fees in the
2	amount of \$1,833,156.19 and \$4,749.95 are approved.
3	As to Pepper Hamilton, LLP, fees of \$5,295,708.50 and
4	expenses of \$124,924.14 are approved.
5	Perkins Coie we're going to pass on for now.
6	As to Prince Lobel Tye, LLP, fees in the amount of
7	\$222,328 and expenses of \$29,451.34, are approved.
8	As to Rubenstein Associates, Inc., fees of \$38,276 and
9	expenses of \$9,920.93, are approved.
10	As to Severson & Werson, P.C., fees of \$3,321,340.39
11	and expenses of \$295,040.35, are approved.
12	For Tilghman & Co., P.C., fees of \$11,507.50 and
13	expenses of \$29,046.14, are approved.
14	As to Towers Watson Delaware, Inc., fees of
15	\$175,665.92 and expenses of \$9,550.01, are approved.
16	As to Troutman Sanders, LLP, fees of \$1,043,948.96 and
17	expenses of \$16,823.37, are approved.
18	As to Weir & Partners, we're holding that for a few
19	minutes.
20	As to AlixPartners LLP, fees in the amount of
21	\$14,708,273.53 (sic) and expenses of \$103,325.70, are approved.
22	As to Analytic Focus, LLC, fees of \$592,840.25 and
23	expenses of \$355.29, are approved.
24	Carter Ledyard, we're holding.
25	As to Coherent Economics, LLC, fees in the amount of

\$1,135,367.52 and expenses in the amount of \$15,194.52, are 1 2 approved. As to Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, we're holding on 3 4 that. 5 As to J.F. Morrow, fees in the amount of \$250,060 and expenses of \$1,345.61, are approved. 6 7 As to Kramer Levin, fees in the amount of 8 \$64,366,016.25 and expenses of \$516,511.68 --9 MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, you're reading from the 10 column for the interim expense request. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. MARINUZZI: It's the one over to the right. 13 THE COURT: It's the 634,000? 14 MR. MARINUZZI: No, no, it's the 2,416,000 --15 THE COURT: I'm sorry, okay. All right. Let me just look at the chart again. All right, let me do Kramer Levin 16 17 again. 18 Fees in the amount of \$64,366,016.25 and expenses in the amount of \$2,416,309.04, are approved. 19 20 As to Moelis & Co., LLC, fees in the amount of 21 \$14,616,129.03 and expenses in the amount of \$249,664.42, are 22 approved. 23 As to Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, LLP, fees in the 24 amount of \$4,843,989.47 and expenses in the amount of 25 \$87,794.29, are approved.

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Quest Turnaround Advisors, LLC, fees in the amount of \$345,646.12 and expenses in the amount of \$17,614.09, are approved. For San Marino Business Partners, LLC, fees in the amount of 236 -- excuse me, let me say that again --\$263,157.38 and expenses of \$11,404.30, are approved. SilvermanAcampora and Wilmer Cutler, we have to come back to. Chadbourne, we're coming back to. The fees of the examiner, Arthur Gonzalez, Mr. Seife has asked to be held until I deal with the Chadbourne fees. Then I will hold them. For Leonard, Street and Deinard, Professional Association, fees in the amount of \$100,000 and expenses in the amount of \$4,210, are approved. Mesirow, we're going to hold. For Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, fees in the amount of \$82,997.85 and expenses of \$1,670.56, are approved. Does anybody wish to be heard with what I've just ruled on so far? MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, I believe there needs to be a discussion had between Mr. Holtz and counsel for the committee. Your Honor, while they're having that discussion, on behalf of all of the professionals, I would like to thank Your

Honor and your team. We know Your Honor and your team put a tremendous amount of effort in going through these final fee applications, and we really do thank you.

THE COURT: Well, since some of you will be leaving the courtroom after this, let me say -- and I know we still have the disputed matters to deal with. I've commented before, this was an extremely complex and difficult case for the lawyers and for the Court. As the numbers I've read into the record show, it was also a very expensive case. Whenever I was asked to rule on interim fees there was sticker shock to me in looking at the magnitude of the fees that were being sought. I take the responsibility of reviewing fee applications very seriously; that's true of the interim applications and final applications.

I think the professionals in this case have done an excellent job. I think the case -- there were a lot of contentious issues, there was a necessity of a number of difficult trials that had to get resolved before the case was able to move to confirmation.

I think it's -- had consensual resolutions of the difficult issues been able to -- and there were many consensual issues, and, certainly, the plan that moved forward was the result of considerable efforts by the mediator, by the parties, to reach a resolution. I certainly wish it could have happened earlier, the expenses of the case would have been vastly

reduced, but it is what it is. 1 2 So I certainly commend all the professionals. I mean, 3 my compliments go to the people -- those that remain to be 4 resolved as well, they'll get resolved. 5 I mean, what are the issues that -- Mr. Mannal, 6 what's --7 MR. MANNAL: Your Honor, I think there's some 8 confusion on the AlixPartners final fee --9 THE COURT: Okay, let me turn to it. 10 MR. MANNAL: -- number. 11 THE COURT: Okay. I may have messed it up. MR. MANNAL: I thought I heard it correct, but I --12 13 it's -- I believe it's \$14,718,273.53. 14 THE COURT: That's what I thought I said, but if it isn't that's what I intended to say. So it should be crystal 15 clear, the court is approving --16 17 MR. MANNAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: -- AlixPartners LLP fees in the amount of \$14,718,273.53, and expenses of \$103,325.70. If I misspoke 19 earlier I apologize for that. All right. 20 21 MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, with respect to Curtis, 22 Mallet, Your Honor and I were consistently wrong in the amount 23 of expenses requested. The actual amount requested is \$53,990- --24 25 THE COURT: Let me -- wait, wait, hang on.

MR. MARINUZZI: Curtis, Mallet, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. MARINUZZI: It is the first page of the chart. 3 4 THE COURT: Tell me, what is the expense fee? 5 MARINUZZI: The expense -- the final expense request is \$53,990.94. 6 7 THE COURT: Let me look at my notes for a minute, 8 okay. 9 (Pause) 10 THE COURT: So, with respect to Curtis, Mallet the expenses from the final period were the \$30,505.36; the 11 12 expenses requested in the final application is of \$53,990.94. 13 MR. MARINUZZI: Correct. 14 THE COURT: Was that right? 15 MR. MARINUZZI: That's right. THE COURT: All right. So the Court -- so the record 16 17 is clear, the Court approves fees to Curtis, Mallet in the 18 amount of \$9,847,770.80, and expenses of \$53,990.94. 19 MR. MARINUZZI: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right. What I'd like to deal with --21 anybody -- well, let's take a ten-minute recess. When we come 22 back what I'd like to deal with first is Perkins Coie, Weir & Partners, Carter Ledyard, Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, 23 24 SilvermanAcampora, and Wilmer Cutler. We'll deal with those, 25 and then we'll deal with Chadbourne, Mesirow and Arthur

1 Gonzalez. Okay. MR. MARINUZZI: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 (Recess from 11:11 a.m. until 11:28 a.m.) 3 4 THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. 5 We're back on the record in Residential Capital, 12-12020. 6 7 Just bear with me a second. Let's deal with Perkins Coie first. Somebody here 8 from Perkins Coie? 9 10 MS. LINDE: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. Selena Linde for Perkins Coie on the conference line. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. Let me find my notes specifically on this. 13 All right. So as I understand it, Perkins Coie is 14 15 seeking final fees in the amount of \$1,462,384.21 -- this is after adjustments with the U.S. Trustee -- and expenses of 16 17 \$13,958.28. 18 The issues are sort of anticlimactic after everything we've been through. These are relatively small items, but I 19 tried to be consistent with everybody's fee applications, large 20 21 or small. 22 The Perkins Coie application included expenses for 23 travel to New York City and nonworking travel time to New York 24 City. The nonworking travel time was billed at fifty percent. 25 I believe I've been consistent throughout this case,

and in all other case -- well, this doesn't come up in that many cases, but I know this has been an issue before in this case. Where law firms staff -- or professional services firms staff matters in ResCap with lawyers or professionals in other offices, I consider their expenses and travel time to be part of their overhead, and not reimbursable by the estate. It has been my practice in this and other cases to compensate for nonworking travel time, for example, if a lawyer is taking a deposition in Chicago and travels from whatever office is their principal office to Chicago for the deposition, their nonworking -- obviously, they get compensated for time actually spent working, but for nonworking travel time at fifty percent.

That guidance, which I know I've delivered before, doesn't apply for traveling to New York City to staff the ResCap matter. The case is pending here; I'm happy to have lawyers from other offices or other places work on the matter; but as I have consistently done I have not compensated either for the expenses or the travel time. So that's one item. It's small it's \$1,123.75.

MS. LINDE: No issue, Your Honor, with removing that.

THE COURT: Let me raise a couple of other issues, and then I'll give you my --

MS. LINDE: Sure.

THE COURT: -- my ruling.

A recurring issue in this and other cases has been the

expenses in connection with preparation of fee applications. In have frequently referred to the guidance I've given on the issue in an opinion in Mesa Airlines, repeated in one of my decisions in Borders Books. While I haven't adopted a hard cap, I've said that the expenses for preparation of fee applications should generally be in the range of three to five percent, and the larger the fees sought, the smaller the percentage should be. So the three percent probably ought to be much less than three percent. And with some of the really large -- and this is not Perkins Coie, it's some of the really large fee applications here. And, in fact, it is less than that.

Perkins Coie in its detailed records in the fee -- in the application, attributed \$14,971.50 to "fee/employment applications." But there's an additional \$2,122 that it charged for appearing here in connection with their fee applications. I consider that part of the fee application.

And when combined with what they attributed to fee applications it exceeded the three to five percent range, in 6.7 percent, the total. Perkins Coie reached a resolution with the U.S. Trustee, and they reached an agreement with U.S. Trustee for a reduction in fees of \$7,233.79.

In addition to that agreed reduction, I'm going to reduce the Perkins Coie application by an additional \$3,802.31 to account for the travel and nonworking travel time items that

I identified. With that adjustment -- so I didn't do the math, but you need to deduct \$3,802.31 from the \$1,462,384.21, to get the final figure. With that change, Perkins Coie is approved.

MS. LINDE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Next is Weir & Partners LLP, which is a miniscule amount, and I'm sorry to single them out. Let me find it. Anybody appearing for Weir & Partners?

Weir only seeks fees of \$2,349 and expenses of \$154.68. The expenses are for the second, third and fourth interim periods. The U.S. Trustee had no objection. But the Weir application for expenses is insufficiently detailed to be approved, and consists entirely of six headings and a total for each heading.

Somebody communicate to Weir that they should resubmit detailed expenses, and no further hearing will be required.

The Court will rule on it when I receive the detail.

MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, if they would like they could withdraw their request for reimbursement of expenses?

THE COURT: They can. So I'll approve the fees, it's 2,349 dollars. The expenses in this case are miniscule.

But every one of these applications we go over in detail, and this has happened earlier in the case when I've required we get the detail on expenses. We don't have it, so it's not approved.

MR. MARINUZZI: We'll get back to them, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's deal with Epiq next. Is someone here for Epiq? Anybody on the phone for Epiq?

Epiq is seeking -- after a resolution with the U.S.

Trustee, Epiq is seeking fees in the amount of \$184,593.16 and expenses for this fifth period of \$42,135.64. The total expenses they're seeking are \$255,878.82.

Epiq has not provided sufficient detail with respect to the expense request for this fifth period, given the magnitude of the expenses, both in absolute terms and relative terms, the amount requested for the fifth period is larger -- of expenses, is larger than the amount of the fees for the fifth period. The lumped entries in the summary of expenses that Epiq provided, that's at ECF docket number 6882, at page 5, are insufficient.

It includes items such as "call center maintenance" and taxes. Without more detail, the Court will not approve Epiq's expenses for the fourth (sic) period. I'm going to hold on the fees and expenses for the fourth (sic) period since the expenses exceeded the total fees. I'll wait to get it. Someone going to communicate with Epiq, Mr. Mannal?

MR. MANNAL: Yes, Your Honor. Doug Mannal from the creditors' committee.

We'll communicate with Epiq. And I believe Todd
Wuertz was on the phone, I'm not sure if he still is.

THE COURT: Is anybody for Epig still on the phone? 1 2 MR. MANNAL: We'll be sure to communicate that to 3 them. THE COURT: Okay. I'll resolve it quickly once I get 4 the additional detail. 5 6 MR. MANNAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Let's deal with SilvermanAcampora. MR. NOSEK: Good morning, Your Honor. Robert Nosek, 8 9 SilvermanAcampora. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. There's a single entry -- and there's no objection from the U.S. Trustee. 11 12 There's a single entry from November 15th, 2013, for 13 Mr. Krell with no attached description. It's at Exhibit A at 14 page 718. It's all of 340 dollars, but it's a blank entry. 15 MR. NOSEK: I apologize to the Court for that. 16 Obviously --17 THE COURT: We really do look at them. 18 MR. NOSEK: Absolutely. 19 THE COURT: And it's not a reflection -- because the work that your firm has done has been excellent, so there 20 21 really is no criticism intended. I think it's just simply --22 the final fee request is \$1,160,460.25. I'm going to approve it reduced by 340 dollars. It's not worth waiting to -- okay. 23 24 MR. NOSEK: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Just somebody when they submit the order,

just deduct -- and there was expenses of \$15,099.70. Okay. 1 2 MR. NOSEK: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 Let's come back to Carter Ledyard now. MR. NOSEK: Your Honor? 5 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. NOSEK: May I be excused? THE COURT: Oh, absolutely. 8 MR. NOSEK: Thank you, Your Honor. 9 10 MR. MANNAL: Your Honor, I believe you also said you had issues with Wilmer Cutler? 11 12 THE COURT: Oh, yeah, I apologize, I was actually 13 putting you off. Let me deal with Wilmer Cutler. Sorry about 14 that. Let me find it in my notes, okay. MR. PERLSTEIN: Good morning, Your Honor. William 15 Perlstein from Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr. 16 17 THE COURT: Let me see what my issue here was. Wilmer, after resolution with the UST, was seeking \$828,680.50 18 19 in fees, and expenses of \$3,713.58. The resolution -- proposed resolution with the U.S. Trustee included a fee reduction of 20 21 \$3,071. The fee application included \$9,484.50 in connection 22 with the preparation of the fee application. And that 23 represented 15.4 percent of the total fees requested, 24 significantly higher than the three to five percent Mesa range 25 that I referred to earlier.

1 I'll give you a chance, Mr. Perlstein. What I'm 2 not -- I'm --MR. PERLSTEIN: I don't believe it was fifteen 3 percent, Your Honor. If it was 9,000 or 128,000 it was going 4 to be --5 6 THE COURT: Well, this was from the fourth period, not 7 the total fees. The fifth period, excuse me. 8 MR. PERLSTEIN: Yeah. I believe that the fee was 9,484 before the reduction, and the total fees for the period 9 10 were 125,000 dollars, or 128,000 before the reduction. So it would have been maybe seven percent, and I think it was the 11 12 issue that Mr. Masumoto talked about in terms of it was --13 THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Mr. Masumoto, 14 okay. And maybe I'm satisfied, maybe my math was just wrong on 15 that. All right. MR. PERLSTEIN: Okay, thank you, Your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: I didn't bring a calculator out with me. MR. MASUMOTO: Your Honor, I believe, as indicated --18 I don't have the exact numbers, but as indicated in our 19 20 pleading, we did address the fee application preparation costs. 21 And I believe we thought the -- I don't remember the exact 22 percentage we obtained, but the three -- we thought the 23 \$3,000.71 reduction brought it within -- or closer to Mesa 24 range. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Let me see whether -- I had some

other notes here.

All right, I'm satisfied by that explanation. So I'm approving fees for Wilmer Cutler of \$828,680.50, and expenses of \$3,713.58.

MR. PERLSTEIN: That matches my --

THE COURT: Okay. That's approved.

MR. PERLSTEIN: -- my notes as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry to keep you here, Mr. Perlstein.

MR. PERLSTEIN: That's all right. Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. Now, we're up to Carter Ledyard. And you're certainly excused, if you wish to be, Mr. Perlstein.

MR. GADSDEN: Good morning, Your Honor. James Gadsden, Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, consultant to the committee of unsecured creditors, not special counsel as we were identified by debtors' counsel at the beginning of the hearing.

My application presents basically a pure issue of law, which is whether an individual or a firm that's retained as a testifying expert in litigation, is required to be retained pursuant to 1103 and 328, and is required to be -- to establish that it is disinterested or does not have an adverse interest as those --

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Gadsden. You weren't retained under 327. You didn't have to be retained under 327. Why did you do a conflicts check?

MR. GADSDEN: At the request, or really insistence of creditors' committee counsel who retained me.

THE COURT: You would testify as an expert witness without having done a conflicts check to see whether your firm has a conflict?

MR. GADSDEN: No -- of course. When I was contacted by the creditors' committee counsel and asked to be retained, I made a check -- ordinary check that the firm conducts any time it's retained to determine whether we had a conflict. And then --

THE COURT: And is it your practice or your firm's practice to bill a client, or prospective client, for a conflicts check, when you do?

MR. GADSDEN: No, Your Honor, not -- but that's not the fees that are involved here. So after I'd done that and was retained, I was given the list of 1,000 parties, including all the judges in this court, all the servicers of the loans administered by the debtors, all the employees in the U.S. Trustee's Office, and the full list of 1,000 people and firms, and told that I had to make an investigation as to whether the firm had any relationship with any of those entities or their affiliates.

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THE COURT: Do you have a written engagement letter? MR. GADSDEN: Yes, Your Honor. It's an exhibit to my retention -- my application. THE COURT: And does it provide for your recovery of expenses for doing conflicts check? MR. GADSDEN: I don't believe it addresses it, Your Honor. THE COURT: It didn't. MR. GADSDEN: Your Honor, as I said, I think the issue presented here was whether that activity is required of the --THE COURT: Why isn't doing a conflicts check to serve as an expert the cost of doing business? MR. GADSDEN: Yes, it was, Your Honor, for the initial check. Not required and not necessary for my firm to be retained as a testifying expert in litigation, not as counsel to a party, not to advise any party or handle the administration of this case. But I was retained as an expert in a piece of litigation. THE COURT: If you were retained as an expert and gave testimony that favored an existing client of your firm, that wouldn't -- would that have been an appropriate subject for cross-examination? MR. GADSDEN: Absolutely. Absolutely. And that check was made. The issue here, again, is given the seven-page list of parties that are required for the full conflicts check for a

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party to establish statutory disinterestedness for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code was imposed upon me and my firm --THE COURT: To turn down --MR. GADSDEN: -- over and above --THE COURT: -- so turn down the engagement or write an engagement letter that specifically provides that you will be compensated -- I'm not sure at the end of the day whether I'm going to approve it, but it should have expressly included a provision that you be compensated -- I mean it's a cost of doing business. MR. GADSDEN: I --THE COURT: You've been practicing law a long time, as I remember. MR. GADSDEN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And you would never undertake a matter without doing a complete conflicts check, would you? MR. GADSDEN: But there's a --THE COURT: Have you ever charged a client for doing a conflicts check? MR. GADSDEN: No, Your Honor, as I've said before. THE COURT: That's --MR. GADSDEN: But the issue here is whether or not a testifying expert in litigation is required to be retained at all --THE COURT: You weren't.

MR. GADSDEN: -- and required to go through this process.

THE COURT: So why did you do a conflicts check?

MR. GADSDEN: It was made a requirement for the retention and engagement in this case.

THE COURT: Would you ever testify as an expert witness without doing a conflicts check, as long as you're a partner in a law firm? You couldn't -- you're not permitted to testify adversely to one of your clients. Are you?

MR. GADSDEN: Of course, Your Honor; and I did that check and I'm not seeking compensation for that.

THE COURT: You know, sometimes conflicts checks require reviewing a thousand different names. I mean it's an enormous -- it can be an enormous burden and you -- I've never -- I've practiced for the same firm for thirty-four years and never once would I have thought of charging a client for a conflicts check --

MR. GADSDEN: But --

THE COURT: -- even as extensive as it might be.

MR. GADSDEN: Here, Your Honor, it wasn't just a check to find out whether I would be subject to impeachment on any basis as a testifying expert. Here it was did I meet the standard of statutory disinterestedness under the Code which included a check, as I said before, of our relationship with any judge who sits on this court, any employee of the U.S.

Trustee's Office. I don't see how that's necessary to establish that the firm lacks bias -- or I lacked a bias in testifying as a testifying expert in a discrete piece of litigation.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Masumoto.

MR. MASUMOTO: Good morning, Your Honor. Brian Masumoto for the Office of the United States Trustee.

Your Honor, as indicated in our pleadings, we did attempt to follow the same rule without distinction as to whether an individual is testifying as an expert or as a professional. We do believe that whether or not as an expert or a professional, as Your Honor suggested in your colloquy, if in fact, the testimony may be adverse to any one of a thousand people included on the conflicts check, that certainly that should be disclosed, and certainly I would think any individual, any expert, would want to make sure that that information is available both to its client and to other individuals.

As for the matters that were included that Mr. Gadsden referred to as to conflicts checks regarding judges and the U.S. Trustee's Office, I certainly don't believe that that amounted to a significant portion of the 31,000 dollars involved in conflicts checks. So whether or not they did that comparison and whether or not that would have had any impact on their testimony, I think it would be a rather de minimis

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portion of the cost that was charged to the estate. Accordingly, we do believe that in accordance with your practice with respect to professionals in this case, that the conflicts undertaken by an expert witness should be the same as that as a professional, and that cost should be borne as overhead by the expert. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gadsden, I have another question for you. MR. GADSDEN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Your invoice number 1135951, dated December 12th, 2013, consisted entirely of entries associated with revising billing records. Why is that permissible? I have --MR. GADSDEN: I --THE COURT: Stop. MR. GADSDEN: Yes. Sorry. THE COURT: I have -- I understand, I'm not saying you were retained as a lawyer; you were retained as an expert. Why should I have --MR. GADSDEN: I accept --THE COURT: -- ruled before --MR. GADSDEN: I accept that adjustment, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Gadsden.

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MR. GADSDEN: All right. I guess I've made my

presentation. I'm would just call the Court's attention to the

list of parties for which the search was required which is attached as Schedule 1 to my affidavit which is part of our retention aff --

THE COURT: Did somebody give you that list electronically so you could run it through your firm's computer system which is the way that conflicts checks ordinarily get done in a big firm?

MR. GADSDEN: Yes, Your Honor. It wasn't -- it wasn't --

THE COURT: You didn't have to manually search a thousand names?

MR. GADSDEN: No, Your Honor. The time that's required is matching up the information that's generated for each of the thousand names and their affiliates. And, as I said, the names are all listed on the schedule to my retention affidavit. And it goes, in my view, Your Honor -- our view on what is required to do to establish lack of bias for the purpose of my testimony.

THE COURT: All right. Court's ruling is as follows.

A lawyer serving as an expert witness is not entitled to be compen -- absent a engagement letter that expressly covers the issue, as to which I won't rule if it is, but in the absence of such a provision, conducting a conflicts check is a cost of doing business not compensable from the estate.

I will reserve if the issue returns to me in some

other case where there is an engagement letter that specifically covers it.

So the Carter Ledyard fee request should be reduced by the amount -- I think it was \$31,494.25 is the amount of the request that pertains to the conflicts check. Additionally, the amount should be reduced by 1,190 dollars for the entry in the December 12th, 2013 invoice 1135951 for revising billing records. As I've held before, that is not compensable.

With those two adjustments, the Carter Ledyard application for fees and expenses is approved.

MR. GADSDEN: Thank you, Your Honor. May I be excused?

THE COURT: Yes, absolutely.

All right. Let's move on to the Chadbourne application.

The Chadbourne application seeks final fees in the amount of 46,860- dollars -- excuse me; let me say that again -- \$46,860,806.66 and expenses of \$2,995,419.47. Those amounts are after the fee reduction agreed upon with the U.S. Trustee of \$30,000. Mr. Seife?

MR. SEIFE: Thank you, Your Honor. Howard Seife from the law firm of Chadbourne & Parke, counsel for the examiner in this case.

I think Your Honor is very familiar with the work of the professionals for the examiner including Chadbourne. As

you know, it was a very extensive undertaking mandated by the request of the parties in the case as to the scope of the investigation which, as we all know, was very broad and dealt with extremely complicated issues that required extensive factual discovery with nine million pages of documents that were produced and reviewed; over ninety-nine days of witness interviews, eighty-three different witnesses. We met with all of the significant parties in the case, many on multiple occasions, had the benefit of their presentations and the benefit of their legal theories as to potential claims in the case. All this culminated in the report which Your Honor's very familiar with, in excess of 2,200 pages with the appendix.

The report identified substantial potential causes of action, over five billion dollars. And we'd like to think that the presence of the investigation and the parties' awareness of the issues we were examining which they were aware of through our frequent meetings, helped in some way foster the ultimate resolution in the case, obviously, with many other parties involved and the assistance of the mediator.

Most importantly, we think we fulfilled the mandate requested by the parties and Your Honor in this case. No one has questioned whether we fulfilled our mandate or that we didn't do it properly and well. The question which is being raised by the objection from the Liquidating Trust relates to the reasonableness of the fees. And one needs to examine

reasonableness in light of the magnitude of the project, the complexity of the issues, and something very important, which is the timeframe within which we are operating.

As Your Honor is well aware, we had very extreme time constraints. We had strict deadlines that the Court asked us to adhere to. There was a lot going on in the case, and it was clear no one wanted the examiner's work to delay the ultimate resolution of the case. That extreme time pressures had its impact on how we approached the examination. Whereas, if we had the luxury of time to do things in a logical sequence, one would commence document discovery, have the benefit of review of documents, prepare for interviews, take that all into account while research is going on, and then sit back and write your report. We did not have that luxury. We were going down all of those paths simultaneously.

So it created enormous strains on the professionals in the case, including our firm, but it was a fascinating assignment. I wouldn't suggest otherwise. Working with the examiner, Mr. Gonzalez, was a wonderful opportunity. And in the end, I think we produced, on time, a work product which was requested by the parties.

Your Honor noted our fee request which is substantial; but it was a substantial undertaking. We have settled, as you noted, with the U.S. Trustee on its objections for the fifth period. Those objections related to three categories:

preparation of the fee application, responding to objections from the U.S. Trustee's Office, and multiple parties at meetings. So that resulted in agreement to reduce the fees, as you noted, by 30,000 dollars.

I think at this point, in light of the objection that's been made, it's important to note that the U.S. Trustee, as Your Honor noted at the commencement to these proceedings, has been extremely active through each interim fee process period in reviewing applications, and we have settled many, many issues with the trustee, and either voluntarily or a result of their efforts, have agreed to various reductions throughout the case and those totaled some 545,000 dollars of reductions in fees and expenses based on their review of each of our interim applications.

In addition, I think it's worth noting when one considers the reasonableness of the application, is that after consultation with the examiner, Chadbourne agreed to forgo its annual fee increases and what we call maturational fee increases for associates that become partners or move up in the ranks. And that resulted in a discount from our fees of 1.8 million dollars.

I think also when considering reasonableness of fees, it's worth looking at blended hourly rates. Chadbourne's blended hourly rate in this case was 594 dollars per hour. And I think when one compares that to the other leading

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professionals, including the debtors' counsel, which was at
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    654,000 dollars -- no -- 654 dollars, and creditors' committee
    counsel which was at 694 dollars per hour, I think in
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    comparison, I think it's worth noting for reasonableness.
             I would also point out that our calculation of blended
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    rate does not include the use of contract attorneys which would
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    have brought that rate down significantly, whereas the debtors'
    counsel did include that in their calculation of a blended
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    rate. So I think the difference would have --
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             THE COURT: Have you run the numbers with the contract
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    attorneys?
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             MR. SEIFE: Excuse me?
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             THE COURT: Have you run the number --
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             MR. SEIFE: No.
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             THE COURT: -- for the blended hourly rate if you had
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    included the contract attorneys?
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             MR. SEIFE: We have not, Your Honor. We could do
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    that.
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             THE COURT: So -- and I'll give you a chance when you
    come to the issue of the contract attorneys --
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             MR. SEIFE: Yes.
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             THE COURT: -- which is something that the Trust has
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    raised but go ahead with your presentation.
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             MR. SEIFE: Yes, and we can certainly do that
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    calculation.
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So again, many -- I'll deal with the specific objections after the presentation by the Trust so we can hear exactly what they're pressing in terms of their objections; however, based on our review of their objection, we did acknowledge in our response, much as we would with the U.S. Trustee, there were certain items which we acknowledge there was probably a valid issue that they've raised, and we're prepared to reduce our fees accordingly.

And --

THE COURT: Why don't you tick those off for me.

MR. SEIFE: I'll tick those off. There are three items.

There was an objection really based on the Trust's review of our 21,000 time entries; they found 49 where the addition, I guess, was off by a total of 14.9 hours resulting in what they view as an overcharge of 8,699 dollars. So we're amenable to reducing our fee application by that amount.

The second issue was the use of summer associates -billing for summer associates. There seems to be a split
within this court as to whether that's appropriate or not.
Rather than get into that debate, we'll write off the fees for
summer associates; 5,757 dollars.

The third issue where we're willing to make a concession involves the category of document review. By way of background, I'm sure Your Honor is well aware of the situation

we faced in the winter, starting November, when the torrent of documents started coming over the transom and required immediate review. And it was at shortly after that point we started bringing in contract attorneys. But as part of the review, we also had Chadbourne associates review documents. Part of it was to maintain quality control and to provide guidance to the contract attorneys, and part of it was just to deal with the volumes that had to be reviewed.

We -- because of the number of bodies that were required for that task, we did need to use some associates who

We -- because of the number of bodies that were required for that task, we did need to use some associates who are probably more senior than one ordinarily would look to. So we had identified six senior -- more senior attorneys in that category and had already voluntarily marked their hourly rates down to third-year associate rates.

The Trust apparently identified some additional attorneys that we hadn't marked down. We're agreeable to doing that and charge them at the hourly rate of third-year associates, the 495 rate. That would amount to an additional reduction in what we're seeking in the amount of 46,600 dollars.

So if I my math is correct, that would net out our current fee request to 46,799 -- 46,799,7- --

THE COURT: Give it to me again. I'm sorry.

MR. SEIFE: Yes.

THE COURT: 46 million --

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\$46,799,750.66. 1 MR. SEIFE: 2 THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from the Trust counsel 3 and then I'll give you a chance to speak. 4 MR. SEIFE: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: But address the con -- the issue of 5 6 contract attorney -- use of contract attorneys, if you would. 7 MR. SEIFE: In terms of the objection they raise? 8 THE COURT: Yes. MR. SEIFE: As I understand the objection, it's based 9 10 on a lack of disclosure of what we were doing, that perhaps the parties were not fully aware that we were using contract 11 12 attorneys. I would note that we did not mark up the contract 13 attorneys. We charged the estate at cost at the forty-eight 14 dollars an hour. I know other law firms treat that differently and do mark up for overhead and other expenses, the hourly 15 16 rate. We did not do that. 17 They were working in our offices and using our facilities, but we passed it straight through as charge --18 19 THE COURT: The contract attorneys were physically present in the Chadbourne offices when they performed the work? 20 21 MR. SEIFE: They were, Your Honor, and they were 22 supervised and overseen by Chadbourne attorneys. There may 23 have been one or two instances where for discrete periods of 24 time one or two of the contract attorneys worked remotely, but

I think that was the exception. And all of them spent

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substantial time on the premises, if not all their time.

In terms of disclosure, I guess, first, we followed the debtors' practice in this case. They hired contract attorneys to assist them well before we did, and we followed their lead.

We listed the expense of contract attorneys in our monthly statements that were circulated among the parties.

The U.S. Trustee's Office, the creditors' committee, were all alerted to our use of contract attorneys.

I filed a supplemental declaration with this court which disclosed that we were using contract attorneys and confirmed that we had checked each and every one for any conflicts, and we used the thousands of names that were referred to in the prior fee application.

The U.S. Trustee was all over our use of contract attorneys. We worked closely with them. We provided them a spreadsheet with productivity data of each of the individuals. Part of the process was to make sure that each of the contract attorneys was maintaining a proper run rate of document review; and the U.S. Trustee was involved with that.

And finally, I would note, we have -- our firm, based on the interim fee applications, we've paid out-of-pocket for those services. So it's come out of the firm's pocket for that.

The final thing I would note, this very issue came up

1	in the Delaware court in the Worldwide Direct case which we
2	cite in our papers, and the court there noted the very issue
3	that these contract attorneys were under close supervision of
4	the firm and that a separate retention application for each
5	individual attorney or for the service that supplies them was
6	not required.
7	So based on all that, we think we acted appropriately
8	and all the parties knew exactly what we're doing. And, not to
9	mention, I think, in chambers with Your Honor, we certainly
10	alluded to it from time to time.
11	THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from the Trust's
12	counsel.
13	MS STADLER: Thank you, Judge.
14	On behalf of the ResCap Liquidating Trust
15	THE COURT: You need to make your appearance.
16	MS STADLER: Okay. A couple of rebuttal
17	THE COURT: You need to make you appearance.
18	MS STADLER: Oh, I'm sorry.
19	THE COURT: Who you are.
20	MS STADLER: I thought you said I did not need to.
21	THE COURT: You do; no.
22	MS STADLER: My name is Katherine Stadler of the law
23	firm Godfrey & Kahn. I represent the ResCap Liquidating Trust.
24	THE COURT: Okay.
25	MS STADLER: We know and appreciate that the Court has

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debtor.

Is that correct?

read all of the materials and is intimately familiar with these cases and do not intend to reiterate what has been written. do, however, want to put the applications that are subject to objection here today, not just Chadbourne & Parke which I will address specifically, but all of them in the context of this case. As you know, the total professional fees in this case are approximately 400 million with about a quarter of that sum allocated to only three contested applications. When the consenting claimants negotiated the plan support agreement in April and May of 2013, it was contemplated that the Trust would review all professional fees both for fees incurred before the --THE COURT: So the Trust isn't --MS STADLER: -- plan before an agreement and after. THE COURT: -- the Trust is one of two trusts created by the plan --MS STADLER: Correct. THE COURT: -- and is the successor of the debtor in that respect. Correct? MS STADLER: Correct. THE COURT: And the Trust steps in the shoes of the

asset.

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MS STADLER: That's correct. It succeeded to the

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THE COURT: And so to the extent that the Court has reviewed and ruled on four interim fee applications before today with objections, generally, from the U.S. Trustee and from the Court, and resolved issues, how do you get to re-trade issues that were raised and resolved with respect to the first four interim applications? I'll deal separately if there were issues that weren't raised or addressed. But to the extent that there were issues that were -- because the thing that was most irritating about your objection -- and I am irritated -is the extent to which you are trying to revisit issues that I considered very carefully and ruled on and that Mr. Masumoto and his colleagues in the U.S. Trustee's Office considered and raised objections where appropriate and sought resolutions. And here you want to wipe the slate clean. You come and you step in the shoes of the debtor, but you don't seem to want to be bound by anything that's happened in this case until now.

Do you know how much you've driven up the expenses for today's hearing with -- yes, you raise a handful of issues that were maybe not raised or resolved previously, but most everything you raise was raised before me before and raised by the U.S. Trustee and resolved. How do you -- where do you -- aren't you bound by what the party who you succeed has done?

MS. STADLER: I don't think so, Judge, respectfully.

You noted earlier the dearth of authority on the point.

Collier does address it, "A final application must be filed at

the end of each professional's engagement even if the professional is not seeking additional compensation or payment. Any amounts that were awarded as interim compensation are subject to reconsideration at any time prior to the final award for any reason."

THE COURT: And when you go look at the cases where those fees and expenses have been reconsidered, it's generally been because the case is administratively insolvent, or they're allegations of breach of fiduciary duty or other professional misconduct. But you want to just retrade issues that were raised and resolved before, resulting in me spending and my staff spending an enormous amount of time going over what we've done before, because you feel you can come in here and just retrade the same issues.

No, I'm not -- I said in my earlier comments, I don't believe that strict preclusion principles prevent you from doing it, but you're asking me to go back and revisit things that I've determined before. And you don't even -- so here's my question. What did you do before you prepared your objection in going back? Did you read all the prior fee applications?

MS. STADLER: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: Did you read all the prior objections filed by the U.S. Trustee?

MS. STADLER: Yes, we did.

THE COURT: Did you read all the transcripts from hearings at which this Court ruled on fee applications?

MS. STADLER: Yes, we did.

THE COURT: And did you note any of that in your papers? Did you note in any of your objections the prior hearings when the issues you seek to raise now were raised, considered, and ruled on by the Court? No, you didn't. How are you being compensated?

MS. STADLER: We've been retained by the Liquidating Trust.

THE COURT: On what basis?

MS. STADLER: On an hourly fee basis.

THE COURT: And do you consider whether you're wasting the trust's money by driving up the costs in this case by raising objections that raise no new grounds from what were considered before? You have a handful, a smattering of issues that you raise that weren't raised before, minor, but, yet, you come and you file this application that's required extensive responses from those parties to whom you've objected, when the Court considered the precise issues before. The U.S. Trustee raised the precise issues before. They were resolved by the Court. You make no allegations of any breach of fiduciary duty, not administrative insolvency, no other -- you really haven't flagged other issues that would cause the Court to want to go back and rule again on issues I ruled on before. You did

it in GM, too.

MS. STADLER: Let me address, briefly --

THE COURT: This is your little cottage industry you have for -- you claim to have some proprietary -- because we had at least one or two telephone conferences I don't think were on the record. I will disclose the content of those. And I believe you told me then, you weren't satisfied with the format in which Chadbourne & Park was providing you with the data on their fees and expenses because it didn't work with your proprietary software that enables you to review all the fees in a case. That's the substance of what was raised before, in a telephone conference before today, sometime before today.

So you've got some proprietary software that you think enables you, well after the fact, to go back and challenge all items that you think shouldn't have been approved, but which were approved, most of which, your objections now, were raised and decided by the Court before. Yet, you stand here now, having consumed an enormous amount of my time, my staff's time, and the applicant's time, to once again address issues that were addressed before.

Yeah, I'm aggravated. I'm mad. What's the authority for you stepping in the shoes of the debtor to raise issues that have been raised before and resolved before?

MS. STADLER: The authority, Your Honor, is in the

trust's obligations under the plan documents to evaluate all of the claims filed. The understanding of the parties who signed off on the plan support agreement --

THE COURT: Are you going to go back and ask the Court to review claim determinations that I've made because I've heard and I still hear slews of claim objections. Are you going to try and revisit because you think you've got an obligation to go back and review everything that's occurred? You're going to ask this Court to review my decisions on the numerous claim objections that have come up?

MS. STADLER: No, certainly not. The administrative expense claims for fees, as you know, are different from other types of claims. The adjudication of a claim objection is certainly final and binding, and the time to appeal those determinations long since have run. The trust and the other parties-in-interest in this case focused their energies during the case on the negotiation of a plan and terms that --

THE COURT: Are you telling me that I didn't take the time to review the interim fee applications --

MS. STADLER: No --

THE COURT: -- carefully --

MS. STADLER: certainly not.

THE COURT: -- scrutinize them and all the detail, and raise issues where I thought it was appropriate to raise issues, or to the extent that the U.S. Trustee, Mr. Masumoto,

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Mr. Driscoll is in the Court, to the extent that they raised
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    issues, you think I didn't consider those at the time?
             MS. STADLER: Certainly not. My representation to the
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    Court is that on behalf of its constituency --
             THE COURT: So why didn't --
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             MS. STADLER: - the trust did not.
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             THE COURT: -- you address any of the colloquy and
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    discussions in the transcripts, which you've said you read, of
    all of the interim fee application hearings.
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             MS. STADLER: We did try to. Let me address that
    issue. Mr. Masumoto provided this morning a chart summarizing
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    the deductions for each of the categories objected to with
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    respect to Chadbourne.
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             THE COURT: Not each, but because --
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             MS. STADLER: Well --
             THE COURT: -- as I said in my --
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             MS. STADLER: Right.
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             THE COURT: -- comments earlier today, the U.S.
    Trustee or the Court may have had objections that covered five,
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    six --
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             MS. STADLER: Right.
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             THE COURT: -- two, some number of categories
    included --
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             MS. STADLER: Right.
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             THE COURT: -- in a larger fee application --
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MS. STADLER: Right.

THE COURT: -- and what I always wanted to be sure was that the number, if there was a proposed resolution by the U.S. Trustee, that it satisfied the Court as to any items that I had identified and not to penalize applicants by adding on to what had been proposed by the U.S. Trustee additional deductions that may have covered the same items that the Court had.

MS. STADLER: Right.

THE COURT: So if you read the transcripts, you'd know that's what I've done --

MS. STADLER: We did.

THE COURT: -- at each of the hearings.

MS. STADLER: Correct. And we did try, in certain specific instances, to conform the objections to the rulings Your Honor had made previously, for example, with respect to travel to and from New York in the Mesirow application, for example. Let me address very briefly --

THE COURT: So you raise the issue of transitory time keepers; you know that Mr. Masumoto raised issues of transitory timekeepers. You raised issues of staffing inefficiency; you know that Mr. Masumoto raised issues about staffing inefficiency. You raised issues about vagueness of -- and usually the issues you've raised about vagueness clearly the entries weren't vague, but you know that Mr. Masumoto and the Court addressed issues of vagueness entries. You know that the

Court regularly raised issues about the number of attendees at hearings or meetings. You raised that issue.

MS. STADLER: Yes, and with respect to certain of those categories, we did undertake to do a line-by-line comparison of the trust's objections to the trustee's objections. For example, in the non-compensable billing activity category that you just mentioned, the trust objection on Chadbourne -- I'm sorry, on Mesirow, for example, is 268,000 dollars consisting of 599 entries. We compared that to the trustee's objection which included 299 entries totaling 176,000 dollars.

THE COURT: And what you don't have in front of you were my own --

MS. STADLER: Right.

THE COURT: -- notes because they're not public.

MS. STADLER: Right.

THE COURT: Because my clerks, interns, and myself would go through the applications to see -- looking for exactly those things.

MS. STADLER: Right. So I guess my point there was, we did undertake an effort to reconcile. We do have Mr.

Masumoto's totals of the deductions, and to the extent it is possible, we are certainly committed to a process of reconciling or trueing up so that no one, as you said earlier, is double dinged for a category. The fact remains, with

respect to Chadbourne, that the objections and our back-of-the-envelope math, based on Mr. Masumoto's chart, the deductions are arranged with the trustee total about 410,000 dollars. Mr. [Seef]'s number was different --

THE COURT: Mr. [Sife].

MS. STADLER: Mr. Seife's number was different, and I will defer to him on that. Nonetheless, without an ability to determine which negotiated categories those deductions resulted --

THE COURT: You get to second guess what was done before because you couldn't find a precise line-up of the items that you're proprietary software identified. So you felt you could come in here and reargue all of those issues. Is that it?

MS. STADLER: No, I don't think so, Judge. I think what we're trying to do is bring the universe of objectionable issues to the attention of the Court for purposes of fulfilling the trust's fiduciary obligation to its constituents, and, as I said, committed to ensuring that the efforts of the trustee and the Court, which are amply noted, are taken into consideration in reconciling any of those objections, but for the benefit of all of the creditors and the constituents who are expecting the trust to be a steward of their assets. They wanted to carry out their obligation under the terms of the plan support agreement to review all fees de novo at the end of the case.

Certainly, there is no suggestion that anyone; not the examiner, not the Court, not the U.S. Trustee's Office fell down on the job. The trust, for its purposes and on behalf of its constituents, chose to defer the comprehensive evaluation of fee applications to the final fee period. That decision, if it turned out to be inopportune, was based on the trust's understanding of the final fee process.

There's certainly no suggestion, as you said, of fiduciary misconduct, administrative insolvency, but there's also a line of case law that Collier cited, and I know Your Honor has read, that suggests that the totality of the circumstances, in that final fee phase, and comparison of the results obtained and many of the other factors that Section 330 articulates is more appropriately in a holistic fashion at the end of the case.

The trust undertook this effort and applied its standards to everyone. It examined anew each and every one of the forty-five applications we've walked through this morning and identified problems with only five. In many instances, it identified no problem. In many instances, it identified problems that were de minimis, and it determined had been adequately resolved by the trustee's objections, which we did evaluate to the extent possible and compare to our own. And there were a few, at the end, that did not come out of that process without continued concerns on the part of the trustees

as fiduciaries. 1 2 THE COURT: And what animates your concern about the 3 Chadbourne application? MS. STADLER: Well, the Chadbourne application as 4 we've arti --5 6 THE COURT: Have you read -- I actually have read the 7 report from cover-to-cover. Have you? MS. STADLER: Yes. No, I cannot claim to have done 8 9 that. 10 THE COURT: How much of it have you read? 11 MS. STADLER: I read the executive summary --12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MS. STADLER: -- and --14 THE COURT: Did you charge your client for doing that? 15 MS. STADLER: No, I didn't. No, I did not, in fact. I read the executive summary, and I would say, to be honest to 16 17 the Court, beyond the executive summary, I probably read five 18 percent of the examiner's report. 19 THE COURT: And --MS. STADLER: Personally, I can't speak for anyone 20 21 else on behalf of the trust. 22 THE COURT: You think the examiner's report was 23 unnecessary or inappropriately thorough? 24 MS. STADLER: Certainly not. No one is questioning 25 that. The examiner served his obligations under his

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appointment order and did the job he was hired to do and did it well.

THE COURT: And you also see that the work plan that was submitted by the examiner on behalf of the examiner was revised from time-to-time?

MS. STADLER: Yes.

THE COURT: So Mr. Seife referred to the parties in the case requesting a broader scope. All that was reviewed with the Court. So Mr. Seife just didn't, and Chadbourne and the examiner, Mr. Gonzalez, didn't just simply go off and willy-nilly decide we're going to examine these additional issues because a creditor or the creditors' committee or some other party didn't just raise the issue. There were revised work plans, budgets that were presented to the Court, and I was certainly aware, throughout, when the scope of the engagement of the examiner expanded.

So you're not questioning the -- I take it then, so you're not questioning the scope of the examiner's investigation?

MS. STADLER: No, we are not, nor are we questioning the performance of the examiner himself. His fees are undisputed. The term Your Honor used earlier, sticker shock, is probably the best explanation for the issues that are facing us today. For an examiner's report in any case and the bulk of the cost of the report, of course, resulting from the

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professional fees and not the examiner's work itself, to consume more than twenty percent of the administrative case budget is shocking. And it caused the trust to take a closer look at those bills. When it did so, it determined that there were items in the bills, some raised previously by the trustee in the Court and some not, that --THE COURT: What items do you raise today that were not previously raised by the Court or the U.S. Trustee? MS. STADLER: Well, there's --THE COURT: Just focusing specifically on Chadbourne. MS. STADLER: Specifically with respect to Chadbourne, we talked about the summer associate fees. THE COURT: Well, that's out so that's --MS. STADLER: Right, there's a larger --THE COURT: That's an issue on which my colleagues may differ. I don't have to rule on it because they've been taken out. MS. STADLER: Right. There's a larger category, and those are itemized in Exhibit C-2 of professionals who were not yet admitted and --THE COURT: You lost on that issue before Judge Gerber, right? MS. STADLER: What Judge Gerber said was that attorneys who had graduated from law school and passed the bar but had not yet been admitted should be compensated as

attorneys. But that attorneys who had hadn't completed their legal education or passed a bar exam, should be paid as paralegals. And given the data that was in the supporting material for the fee application, there was no way to know why one attorney was or was not admitted. So that --

THE COURT: Okay. And do you have a case that supports -- because I didn't see any case law that -- and I think the U.S. Trustee from time-to-time raises this issue. But I don't know of a specific published decision that addressed the issue of what the appropriate compensation rate for graduates of law school not yet admitted to the bar is. Do you have any cases?

MS. STADLER: No, I don't. Certainly not published cases. The other categories not included in the trustee's universe of objections include, primarily, the typesetting and proofreading issue, and the clawback issues that are identified. There's also --

THE COURT: Let's take the clawback issue because -- MS. STADLER: Sure.

THE COURT: -- it's easy for me to deal with right off the bat. I'm really surprised by your objection, because you seem to say they should have just returned the documents. Whether the request for a clawback was well taken or not, just give it back. Why did you incur this cost?

I reviewed document -- there's no transcript from

this, I don't think, because I reviewed where, I think, that the trustee -- excuse me, the examiner and his counsel endeavored to resolve the issues without the necessity of court intervention. It's my standard rules, I applied here, and they got many of the issues resolved. When they couldn't get the issues resolved, I reviewed boxes of documents in camera, and I got letter briefs with respect to clawback claims, what the arguments were, and I ruled on them. And I'm more often -- the examiner won on most, lost on a few, some were resolved with redactions that I approved.

The bottom line is, most of the clawback requests were not well taken. The Court overruled them, and your brief suggests just give the documents back despite, and I remember as the clock was ticking and I'm responsible for that, okay, the time pressure was directly the result of deadlines I imposed. This was a big case. If I hadn't imposed deadlines, we still wouldn't have a confirmed plan. The quarterly professional fees would have continued to skyrocket. So this case was moving forward. I set what I thought were reasonable but tight timelines.

The examiner's report was a very important -- the case is perhaps a little unusual because it was the overhang of the completed examiner's report that finally led almost all the parties to a consensual resolution. I say, almost, because the JSNs did not, and we had to have some trials about it but --

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and the parties, most of the parties-in-interest were very aware of what issues the examiner was looking at. And I have no doubt that the overhang of that report was a motivating factor in coming to a consensual resolution.

But one of the arguments I heard on the clawback request is because of the deadlines, Judge, that you've imposed, we're working on sections of this report that refer to documents, refer to interviews as to which now there's a clawback request, and we have to go back, and as Mr. Seife says in his response to your objection, they have to go back and look at all the different work streams, all the different sections that are being drafted. And if a document's clawback, remove references to the document or interview testimony based on the document. And so it was real problem, and it all got resolved. It got resolved because if they couldn't resolve the clawback requests on their own, I heard it in camera. I looked at the documents, and I entered -- I know there's a written order where there was a long list of specific documents where I'd overruled or I said with the following redacted, et cetera, but your paper is just, give it back. Isn't that the position you've taken?

MS. STADLER: The position that we've taken is that the trust's understanding of the process, the expedited process for document production --

THE COURT: Just tell me this. Answer my question,

and then I'll let you give an answer. You've taken the position that rather than fighting clawbacks, the examiner and his professionals should have just returned the documents?

MS. STADLER: I don't think that --

THE COURT: Yes or no?

MS. STADLER: I don't think that fairly characterizes our brief. I think what we've stated is that we think that the amount of time spent on clawback activities, in both professionals, warrants a closer look. And that we've raised that for the Court's attention. And obviously your judgment, as an experienced participant in the process, certainly carries the day.

The only other issue that does not overlap in any respect with the trustee's objection is the typesetting. You had asked me to itemize those.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. STADLER: And that's a 371,000 dollar expense.

And I do want to, just briefly, address the different

methodology we applied for Chadbourne and Mesirow because I

know that was an issue raised in the responses. When we looked

at this, on behalf of the trust afresh in the final fee-review

process, we looked at all the documents Your Honor has itemized

and discussed, and asked ourselves what role Chadbourne and

what role Mesirow played and how the two of the them worked

together to create this significant work product.

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The premise underlying the objection and the different treatment of the professionals is that Chadbourne & Park, as the legal counsel and the primary drafter of the document, was responsible for the final packaging of the product and putting it to press and putting it out to the public. The financial advisor role, in the Liquidating Trust's view, is a supporting function to provide very high level detailed financial analysis, which Mesirow certainly did. But to have Mesirow professionals, in addition to Chadbourne professionals, spending millions of dollars and time in editing and proofreading once that text had been consolidated with a single document production system, in this case a typesetter, that the process could and should have been streamlined with Chadbourne taking the lead on editing, creating more uniformity, making sure that things flow and fit and together, and that the role of the financial advisor, at that point, would be limited to financial checking and making sure the financial representations and the charts and tables were adequate. THE COURT: Have you ever undertaken an investigation of the scope and magnitude of this one? MS. STADLER: I don't think many people have, Judge. THE COURT: And what is it that -- why is that you think your judgment should be substituted for that of the professionals who undertook this engagement? MS. STADLER: The trust believes that its judgment

ought to be given weight in the analysis, not necessarily to override the professionals, when the context of the case is viewed as a whole, when the cost of the process, the role of all the other players, as you've mentioned, including the parties, Judge Peck as mediator, all of those things in the trust's view contributed to the success of the case. And while the examiner and his report played an important role, I think the trust takes issue with the characterization of the examiner's report as the catalyst for resolution because certainly the trust constituents --

THE COURT: Nobody could have predicted, at least I didn't predict -- let me leave it at that -- that the impending release of the examiner's report -- yes, I knew that, obviously, I entered an order for mediation. And I knew that Judge Peck was very actively engaged in mediation. And I set a deadline for the completion of the examiner's report. I know those were going on at the same time. And it was the wild card what impact would the examiner's report have on the parties' settlement positions.

And I certainly wasn't predicting a request; the examiner's report was done. It was about to be filed, and the parties to the mediation requested that the examiner's report be placed under seal, over the objection of the U.S. Trustee, for the short-time to allow -- I guess the parties had reached an agreement in principle. It was a question of when it was

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going to come on for a court hearing, at least until that time, and I carefully balanced the arguments. I'd rejected -- I think Mr. Masumoto was the one who presented the U.S. Trustee's position about it. It was a difficult question for the Court, but I did; I left it sealed because it was only for a short period of time. Okay. And there probably are not many situations where the sequence of events will happen exactly the same way. But you think that because the report got sealed, until the parties had cut their deal, that means that the examiner and his professionals, that their compensation should be cut? MS. STADLER: No, certainly not. What the trust is asserting is that in the context of this final review process where the outcome of the case is determinative, in part, by the reasonableness of the fees, the factors, the contributors --THE COURT: You don't think this case has a good out -- I wish that it had been resolved much earlier. certainly wasn't because of the examiner that it wasn't resolved earlier. You think this didn't have a good outcome?

MS. STADLER: Well, I think the trust feels that the recovery that the unsecured creditors are receiving is adequate. I think they think better control of the administrative expenses of the case could have made the recovery better. I think that's probably true --

THE COURT: Probably true.

MS. STADLER: -- of unsecured creditors in most cases. 1 2 THE COURT: Yeah, that's probably true in most 3 cases --MS. STADLER: Yeah. 4 5 THE COURT: -- too. 6 MS. STADLER: Yeah. 7 THE COURT: Yeah, I agree. MS. STADLER: So I mean, in the end, Judge, I want to 8 make clear that the trust, again, is appearing today and 9 10 presenting these issues to the Court in its role as fiduciary. 11 THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Do you agree, 12 because I've made some comments about this from the bench 13 before, that the examiner and his professionals -- I'm not 14 saying a different standard of review, that I apply a different 15 standard of review in reviewing the applications of the examiner and his professionals, but I've also commented it 16 17 seems to me the examiner and his professionals stand in a 18 somewhat different position in the case than the debtor's 19 counsel, the Creditors' Committee counsel, et cetera. They're fulfilling a different role. They're not representing a 20 21 constituency. They had an assignment. Yes, it expanded, 22 appropriately, in my view. And they fulfilled that role. you successfully negotiated reductions in fees by Morrison & 23 24 Foerster and Kramer, Levin. I raise no issue about it. They

consented to those reductions. But don't you agree, that an

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examiner, in a case, and the examiner's professionals stand in a different relationship to the case than do other court approved professionals in a case?

MS. STADLER: I agree that the examiner is in a different role than the other case participants, exactly, for the reason you've stated. They are not a pre-existing participant as the debtor's counsel are, and they are not representing a constituency as the Creditors' Committee is. I disagree with the premise that that somehow changes the treatment that those professionals, representing the examiner, should get under Section 330. The trust's position is that Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code, all of the case law interpreting it, ought to be applied to every case professionals in the same way.

THE COURT: And I have. But let me ask you this.

When I ask you to identify areas with respect to Chadbourne that you think were not previously raised, you raise the issue about summer associates; that's off the table. You've raised the issue about attorneys not yet admitted to the bar. I'm not sure whether Mr. Masumoto had ever raised that issue with Chadbourne or not, usually, the U.S. Trustee is not shy about raising that issue. You raised the issue about typesetting. I have Mr. Seife's response that deals with the reasons, particularly given the time pressure and just the length of the document, as to why. Are there other categories in your

1	objection that you think were not previously raised in the
2	case?
3	MS. STADLER: I think the issues that were previously
4	raised were not raised to the full extent that they were, but
5	there was some overlap in the remaining issues as I'm looking
6	down the list.
7	THE COURT: So the summer associates, off the table.
8	The not-yet-admitted attorneys, the typesetting you think those
9	are the only issues that weren't raised at all? I'm not so
10	sure about the not-admitted attorneys, but I don't
11	MS. STADLER: Yeah, I would agree that there's
12	different definitions used in the different fee processes on
13	that one. But was it raised as a generic proposition, yes.
14	Was
15	THE COURT: So you agree that the not-yet-admitted
16	attorneys was raised in the case?
17	MS. STADLER: By the U.S. Trustee, correct.
18	THE COURT: Okay, all right.
19	MS. STADLER: Yeah, and I think that
20	THE COURT: So what I want to know is whether there
21	are areas in your objection that were not raised before.
22	MS. STADLER: I think we've covered those.
23	THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else you want to
24	add with respect to Chadbourne?
25	MS. STADLER: No, Judge.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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Mr. Seife, do you want to respond?

Mr. Masumoto, do you want to get into this mix?

MR. MASUMOTO: Just briefly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MASUMOTO: With respect to the issue -- Brian

Masumoto for the Office of the U.S. Trustee -- with respect to

the issue of unadmitted attorneys, I believe our pleads may

have referred them to an issue involving law school graduates

not yet admitted to the bar or that. But we, in fact, did

raise it and, in fact, although not to discuss settlement

issues, we took into account the different rulings by this

Court and reached, at least in our mind, an appropriate

resolution. And so they were included in the overall

reductions on a number of occasions. It may have been on one

interim period that we did not raise it. I don't know that the

amount was not significant. But as indicated in the chart that

I supplied, certainly the issue of unadmitted attorneys were

addressed specifically and were included in our pleadings.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Masumoto.

All right, Mr. Seife, do you want to respond?

MR. SEIFE: Thank you, Your Honor, Howard Seife,

23 || Chadbourne & Park. I think Your Honor covered in great detail

24 many of the things we would have raised in response to the

25 objections, so I'm not going to go over the objections that it

sounds like you've dealt with.

On the issue of unadmitted attorney fees, it clearly was raised by the U.S. Trustee and that was part of our resolution on the interim fees. I would just note each of the unadmitted attorneys did pass the bar and, thankfully, have been admitted.

THE COURT: Happily for them.

MR. SEIFE: So just the principle of the objection, which I won't get into on the merits because it has been resolved in prior fee applications, I would take exception to.

I think Your Honor noted our response on the use of an outside vendor to perform, what people refer to typesetting, but in this day and age nobody is setting type anymore. It's really electronic document production. And it involves the systems of word processing, changes of footnotes in sequential numbers. It's a very sophisticated process. And as we noted, fairly early in the process, we had so many different work streams going with so many different parties producing their sections of what would be a very long report. And the difficulty of tying all those together, knitting them together, forced us to discuss with the examiner going to an outside service. We interviewed four different outside vendors. We picked the one we thought would be most appropriate. The examiner agreed, and that was disclosed in one of our interim applications. It was approved and Chadbourne wrote a check to

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    the vendor.
                 So --
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             THE COURT: I'm going to give you a confession --
             MR. SEIFE:
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                        Yes.
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             THE COURT: -- Mr. Seife, and that is, I read every
    page of the report on my iPad.
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             MR. SEIFE: Did you find any typos?
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             THE COURT: I don't remember because I downloaded the
 8
    PDFs onto my iPad, and it was easier carrying the report.
    isn't to say -- I'm not suggesting it was not appropriate to
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    have the printed copies, but I read it on my iPad.
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             MR. SEIFE: And I must say when the report was
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    released from the -- released by the Court, we had long lines
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    of parties in the case at our office seeking hardcopies, so I
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    think a lot of people found the hardcopy much easier to read
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    than the electronic version.
             Are there any other of the objections that you'd like
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    me to address, Your Honor? I --
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             THE COURT: No. All right.
             MR. SEIFE: -- think they've been dropped or --
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             THE COURT: Okay. So let me --
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             MR. SEIFE:
                        -- dealt with.
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             THE COURT: With respect to the Chadbourne
    application -- well, first, is there anybody else who wishes to
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    be heard with respect to the Chadbourne application?
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             Mr. Gonzalez, you want to be heard?
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MR. GONZALEZ: Yes, thank you.

THE COURT: Sorry for not having recognized you before.

MR. GONZALEZ: I'm Arthur Gonzalez, the examiner, in the ResCap case. Much of what I was going to say, Your Honor, I think you've dealt with, but I was struck by a few comments being made by counsel for the trust. One of the points I wanted to make, that is extremely frustrating to me in looking at the objections that were filed, was that there's amnesia as to what happened in this case by the trust. And who is the trust? The trust is made up of members of the committee, at least one holder of a significant piece of an indenture in which the indentured trustee sat on a committee, and with that knowledge this objection is filed.

They also have -- you noted that the trust is successor-in-interest of the debtor. They have debtor's counsel working for the trust. They have committee counsel working for the trust. Either one of those two counsels could put in context much of this for counsel for the trust here today. And I just note that in a limited objection to committee filed to the December fees when it saw this -- an adjournment of examiner's fees, and the Court granted it. It says very clearly on page 6 paragraph 7 that the committee made a general review of each of the examiner's professionals' monthly fee statements and interim fee applications. Further,

on page 6 paragraph 8, the committee stated that it believes that the Liquidating Trust Board should have the opportunity to perform such review post-effective date and is confident that the Liquidating Trust Board, representing the interest of all the creditors whose funds will be used to pay the fees of the professionals, will be able to perform such review promptly.

So we know who was on the board. We know that the committee intended that board to look at the fees. We know that the committee members or the committee itself all looked at the examiner's fees and, yet, when it came time to the work plan object -- it's not really an objection with respect to the examiner's work plan. It appeared to me in paragraphs 16 through 20 of the Chadbourne fee application, that there's an assertion that I did not fulfill my self-imposed obligation to promptly advise the Court and the parties as to any significant variance in the estimate provided in the amended work plan.

Well, first of all, many examiners may not do budgets; we did a budget. Many examiners who do budget may not represent that they intend to promptly advise the Court and the parties if there are any changes. So this trust, basically, doesn't file a dollar-amount objection, but intimates that that obligation wasn't satisfied, in spite of the fact, that we're the only ones in the case, that I know of, that did a budget, certainly submitted a budget.

We sat down in chambers conference with counsel for

the committee present, debtor's counsel present, the U.S.

Trustee present, obviously with the Court, explained every step along the way in which fees were escalating. Initially, they were escalating linearly -- and that may not be a word, but I think -- they were escalating based on the amount of time we were spending. Then it became -- when discovery exploded around January 2013, it advanced to a much greater amount proportionately, and we turned around and filed more and more supplements. And ultimately, the last one had the numbers in it.

But we have a board on the trust who sat on a committee, who saw the monthly fee statements, knew what was going on, and now represents -- and I just heard it from counsel -- that better control of administrative expenses.

Well, where were they? They knew exactly what was going on with us. They had more information about us than they probably had about any other professional. As for the Court, because the monthly fee statements themselves were not filed with the Court under the monthly fee order, we provided the Court with more information, more current information, than the Court otherwise had on any other professional because the Court was left with the interim fee applications, which naturally lag in time in terms of information.

So with all of this information, the trust forgets it and tries to cast a very negative image of the examiner's

do with that? They don't object to the examiner's professionals about that. They don't object to the examiner's fees, which they well should have, because if I failed to live up to that obligation this is where the adjustment should be made, on my fees not theirs. I told Chadbourne what to do.

Mesirow had nothing to do with it. So in their view if they weren't promptly informed, as I said I would, this is where they should have come. But instead, they put it in an objection to Mesirow and to Chadbourne just to try to get some negative inference about the conduct of their performance of their professional obligations. It made no sense to me. So the better control they wanted in this case, then they should have exercised better control.

In terms of percentage of recovery, I've heard this before. It's kind of an interesting argument. I can understand it from a creditor's standpoint. But as a very practical matter, you cannot have an examiner do an independent investigation if the examiner's professionals believe if the case is not successful, we may not get paid. It just can't happen. It needs to be dealt with in the scope of the examination, not an afterthought and say, wait a minute, the amount of your examination was a greater percentage of recovery than we expected; therefore, you need to share the burden and take a hit. That's exactly what's going on here. It would

undermine the independence of any examiner if that were -first of all, that's not a standard anyway. It's not a
standard under 330. You don't look back and see what people
are going to recover and turn around and say what was
reasonable at the time you expended it, at least not if you're
retained on an hourly basis.

So I won't go through a lot of what I said because, as I said, I think it was addressed. And just with -- we haven't gotten to Mesirow's, but as a general statement, certainly with respect to Chadbourne and Mesirow, their fees, I think, are reasonable under the circumstances based upon the quality of the report that was produced and the time frame it was produced. And there's nothing, I believe, in this record that would alter that with the exception of whatever modifications were already made by the parties before the Court; nothing in the case law, nothing in the statute that would really change the outcome, whether or not the examiner's report had an impact on the mediation, whether the examiner's report had no impact on the case at all. It's really irrelevant to what the exam -- whether the fees were reasonable for the work that we did.

And it may not be a good thing for creditors to hear.

They may not be pleased about, but that's the reality of what
the standard is under 330. And with that, I will sit down.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GONZALEZ: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anybody else who hasn't been heard that wants to be heard?

Okay, with respect to the Chadbourne fees, first section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that and this is a(1), "After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a hearing" and it goes on, the court may award fees and expenses. So notice and a hearing is required, and that's what we're having today. There was some issue, and I don't think this was on the record. It was in one or more telephone calls. There was an issue as to whether there would be any evidentiary hearing with respect to today's hearing. The law of the Second Circuit and elsewhere -- there's a published Third Circuit decision, there's an unpublished Second Circuit decision -- that the bankruptcy court has broad discretion in deciding what procedure to follow. What the Code required is notice and a hearing and an opportunity for parties to be heard, and that's what's happened today.

Extensive briefing has been filed by the parties not only with respect to Chadbourne but the other contested fees, as well. And I've concluded it's unnecessary for the Court to have an evidentiary hearing. That the record before me, the extensive fee applications which the Court has reviewed, and there have been some declarations that have been put in, the trust put in an authorized reply that I received, I think, yesterday, received an additional short brief and a

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declaration. I've reviewed them, but no evidentiary hearing is required.

The Court has made a thorough review. As I indicated earlier, with respect to each of the interim applications, I did make a thorough review. But with respect to the final application, I have done that as well. I've made a final review. And while all issues of fees at a final hearing, I suppose, are fair game for objection and requests, so the preclusion doesn't apply to what the Court decided on an interim basis, the Court believes that absent unusual circumstances, the Court should not -- and unusual circumstances would be new issues that have been raised, new facts that are raised that weren't raised at the time of the interim applications -- that the Court is not required to go back and revisit every decision that was made previously, every resolution by the U.S. Trustee, which as I said before has done a very good job throughout this case in reviewing fee applications.

When I asked Ms. Stadler to identify what are the new issues, I think there's one that we didn't talk about that I do want to raise, and that's the -- after the examiner was released from the case, there were fees that were incurred. And that was an issue that was raised in the trust brief. We haven't previously spoken about it; that was not previously raised. I think that the Chadbourne response dealt with that

quite effectively. There were discovery requests that were -requests may be the wrong term -- subpoena from the U.S.

Attorney in the Central District of California, for one, and
perhaps some others, where the trust -- the examiner and his
professionals had to respond to a subpoena from the United

States, and the fees were incurred and the expenses that were
incurred after.

And I think the response that Chadbourne filed, showed that the order that discharged the examiner's professionals specifically covered fees incurred. So I think that that answer is really provided in the reply that Mr. Seife had filed. I agree with it completely. And I was privy -- there were conferences with, I believe, the U.S. Trustee was present but also the U.S. Attorney from Los Angeles was -- the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles was on the phone for those. We had discussions about how the subpoena was going to be dealt with, and it's clearly appropriate, in my view, that those fees are reimbursed, and that's included in this final interim fee application, I believe.

So that wasn't covered before, Ms. Stadler, but that was an issue that you raised that I think probably had not previously been raised.

So the Court's review of all of the pleadings in this matter and a review of the fee applications, for the overwhelming majority of what the objections covered by the

trust, those were raised, considered by the Court, ruled on by the Court, usually with a resolution by the U.S. Trustee, and no facts have been brought to the Court's attention that would suggest that they should be revisited. I'm not saying what the precise legal standard, but I tried to be flexible in looking at was there really anything in the trust objection that wasn't really considered by the Court, or new facts or circumstances brought to the Court's attention which should lead to reopening the issue. I didn't believe there was.

So with respect to these new issues that have come up, the issue about summer associates is resolved because Chadbourne has withdrawn that from the application. With respect to attorneys not yet admitted, that was raised by the U.S. Trustee, resolved as part of the interim applications, the Court is satisfied with the resolution that was made. There isn't complete uniformity among the judges. I asked Ms. Stadler -- and my research is the same as hers -- I have not found any cases that deal specifically with the issue. I'll save it for another day when I have to rule on it. Here, I believe, I'm satisfied with the resolutions that the U.S. Trustee reached throughout.

With respect to the typesetting, it's a large expense.

I believe that the Chadbourne reply has adequately dealt with

it, the time pressures under which they were operating; the

length of the report -- it wasn't just pure -- typesetting

really is a misnomer for what the process was going on -- the review of the final report by Mesirow -- we'll get to the Mesirow application separately -- in the Court's view, was all appropriate.

The report -- it's an excellent work product. I don't know, Mr. Seife, did you find some typos? I didn't look for it, but --

MR. SEIFE: No. I was just concerned that in your review, you may have found something.

THE COURT: Okay. It's an excellent report. It may have been not foreseen as it was getting to its end that just the impending report would have the effect it had on the case. But I agree with Mr. Gonzalez that examiner's fees, examiner-as-professional's fees can't be dependent on whether there's a consensual resolution of the case or not. I would say there have been cases, and I've written on this, when I have declined -- I've over -- I've denied a motion for appointment of an examiner. I did it in Dewey & LeBoeuf. And the argument was that the statutory criteria for an examiner were satisfied. I wrote an opinion, I won't revisit it now, but what was crystal clear in Dewey & LeBoeuf was there would be nothing for anybody if there were a complete exam, because of the cost of the examination if it was to be meaningful.

So here, substantial creditors requested it. The statute, I think, makes it mandatory in that circumstance.

This was clearly -- in light of the issues that had been raised early in the case, the number of related-party transactions with the nondebtor parent, it was clearly necessary and appropriate. The scope was reviewed with the Court. It was modified with the approval of the Court. There was a budget that increased; it was reviewed with the Court. The Court and the major parties-in-interest were all privy to what the examiner was doing and what the expense, the growing expense, the time, and so it's inappropriate now to be second-guessing the judgments and the decisions of the examiner and his professionals. And I believe the examiner did appropriately supervise his professionals in a very substantial undertaking.

So for all of those reasons, I'm approving the Chadbourne application for fees and expenses with the three reductions that Mr. Seife specifically identified: 8,699 dollars for math errors, 5,757 dollars for the summer associates, 46,600 dollars for document review had to do with the level of the associates that were undertaking that work. So those amounts will be deducted. I believe, if I'm correct, Mr. Seife, the final figure is \$46,799,750.66?

MR. SEIFE: Yes. That's the right figure for fees, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And the expense number -- total expense is \$2,995,419.47.

MR. SEIFE: Yes, that's correct.

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THE COURT: All right. With the three -- that's not -- that doesn't include the three reductions that we've talked about, does it, Mr. Seife? The three that I just -that I cataloged? Well, to get to the 46,799,750.66, that does. MR. SEIFE: Yes. So that's the reduced. THE COURT: And that's approved. MR. SEIFE: Thank you. THE COURT: The Trust's objections are overruled. Let's go on. I want to try and get this all done. Let's deal with Mesirow. MR. SEIFE: Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Scheler. MR. SCHELER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. For the record, Brad Scheler, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, on behalf of Mesirow Financial Consulting, LLC. Your Honor, I'm here today with my colleagues Lisa Bebchick and Peter Siroka. Also in the court today are representatives of our clients, Mr. Tuliano and Ms. Knoll. As always, Your Honor, it's an honor and a privilege to be in your courtroom. I'm here to echo the sentiments that Your Honor has already heard from the examiner, the Honorable Arthur Gonzalez, as well as from fellow practitioner and friend, Howie Seife from Chadbourne. Without being overly repetitious, Mesirow,

like Chadbourne, has had all of its charges subject to review and scrutiny by the office of the United States Trustee, by all parties-in-interest and, of course, by this Court.

Mesirow understands and appreciates the important distinction between interim and final review. However, between interim and final review, nothing has altered or changed the results, efforts and efficiency of Mesirow in these cases, including, with respect to Mesirow, complying fully with the direction of its client the examiner.

There's nothing new. There's nothing improvident.

The work done by the examiner was first-rate, which was not surprising, and the work done by the examiner's professionals was also first-rate; also not surprising.

Indeed, as the Court has stated, the work of the examiner's professionals should be commended and appreciated. The irony here, as Your Honor has heard, is that the parties-in-interest that have already directly benefited from the work that -- the irony is that the parties who have benefited from the work are now the parties that are in control of and are the beneficiaries of the very Trust that is before the Court objecting. That they are pursuing objections against the examiner's professionals is both ironic and painful. And we understand that while the Trust professionals are duty bound to adhere to the wishes and direction of their client, sometimes, Your Honor, as officers of the court, it's also our duty to

push back. This may be one of those instances, Your Honor.

They're simply not right under these circumstances to pursue these objections against the examiner's professionals, especially given the positive results that these cases have had for the Trust and for all the parties-in-interest. First, the examiner did extraordinary work here, as I said. Secondly, these are all, as Your Honor has observed, after-the-fact objections, and the Trust's attempts to take a second or a third bite at the apple is not appropriate. It will also potentially have the effect of impairing the ability of the United States Trustee to reach resolution of issues raised with respect to interim fee applications. Parties want to know that when they come to a landing with the approval of the Office of the United States Trustee and the approval of this Court, they are done. And that incentivizes reductions, Your Honor.

Third, Your Honor, I worry a bit that if there's any embrace of the Trust's objections here, it would put a club in the hand of parties-in-interest in future Chapter 11 cases and may have a chilling effect on the work of examiner's professionals in those cases. But most importantly, Your Honor, we know and understand that this Court always has the right to and must hold all professionals to the highest of standards which we in Mesirow completely embrace. It is wrong for the Trust to come in here, under these circumstances and in their own self-interest, to endeavor to work a baseless

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forfeiture of the professionals and to challenge the work that was done by the Office of the United States Trustee and by this Court. I understand, Your Honor, that the Court has reviewed the pleadings. I know well that you take to heart all that is submitted to you. Given the overlap between us and Chadbourne, I will not delve further into the arguments unless the Court desires us to do so, or until Ms. Stadler has presented --THE COURT: Could you -- Mr. Scheler, there were certain reductions that Mesirow has agreed to make. Am I correct? MR. SCHELER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Could you itemize those? MR. SCHELER: Well, Your Honor, overall, in the entirety of the case, we reduced in its --THE COURT: No, I don't want -- that's not what I'm asking you about. I know that there have been reductions at various points in the case. But when I read the response, there were certain additional adjustments that Mesirow has agreed to make. MR. SCHELER: Your Honor, it's only a de minimis, I think, 256 dollars with --THE COURT: All right. MR. SCHELER: And Your Honor, I want to clarify one

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other thing. Our final request, the actual amount is

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39,472,705. It was originally 34,492. In the colloquy between you and Mr. Masumoto, and in your numbers, the 20,000 dollars was not reduced; that was the subject of the final interim, which was in the amount of 57,179, which we reduced by the 20,000. So the number that should be --THE COURT: Give me -- what's the number on the table? MR. SCHELER: What it should be now is 39,472,705. THE COURT: Okay. And that's reflected in the chart I was given this morning. MR. SCHELER: Yes. And the expenses are the 344,747. THE COURT: Okay. MR. SCHELER: Your Honor, both myself and Ms. Bebchick can go through any of the details. But I think at this point, perhaps, it is wise and prudent for me to defer to the Trust counsel. THE COURT: Yeah, let me hear from Ms. Stadler. MR. SCHELER: Thank you. MS. STADLER: Thank you, Judge. Adopting the methodology from the earlier report, I'll focus only on those items that were not previously addressed by the United States Trustee. THE COURT: Thank you. MS. STADLER: The Trust has identified some duplicate time entries. It's unclear whether they're the same ones that were identified by the United States Trustee or not. The Trust

did identify 229,000 dollars in rate increases. I do not because that that issue was raised by the United States Trustee.

The Exhibit B that we've prepared showing the time increment practices of a particular timekeeper and the request of reduction for that, I do not believe was raised by the United States Trustee.

THE COURT: Just cover that. So you're talking about the seniority increases during the course of the case? Is that what you're referring to? So when people move up a year, their billing rate --

MS. STADLER: Right.

THE COURT: -- goes up. That's what you're referring to?

MS. STADLER: The rate increases -- the issue is the statement in the retention materials that rate increases will be -- would be disclosed by affidavit, and Exhibit A-2 to our objection itemizes people whose rates changed throughout the engagement --

THE COURT: But my question is --

MS. STADLER: -- for which there was no disclosure.

THE COURT: In other words, rate increases, one would ordinarily think first year in a law firm, first-year associates are billed at X dollars. If the firm increases its rates so that first-year associates are now billed X-plus-

fifty, that's a rate increase.

Is it your view that a maturity increase -- so when someone goes from a first-year associate to a second-year associate, their rate goes up. I didn't understand the disclosure of any rate increases to cover seniority increases.

MS. STADLER: That may just be a nomenclature issue, Judge, but from the perspective of the clients, when rates go up, rates go up, and they affect the bottom line. And a case of this length --

THE COURT: So when someone's a third-year associate, they've got a lot more experience than a first- or second-year associate. And that's ordinarily reflected in a higher billing rate. That's true in your firm, isn't it?

MS. STADLER: Ordinarily. But I --

THE COURT: Is that true in your firm? Are there seniority increases in your firm?

MS. STADLER: There are. But they're not imposed in the middle of an engagement without --

THE COURT: Is that right?

MS. STADLER: -- consulting the client.

THE COURT: So when an associate who was a first-year associate when they started working on the matter and they become a second-year associate or the matter continues on, they become a third-year associate, you don't make any increase in their rates to reflect their seniority?

1	MS. STADLER: Not without disclosing it
2	THE COURT: Really?
3	MS. STADLER: to the client.
4	THE COURT: Okay. And so when the statement for
5	professional services comes in and it shows the hourly shows
6	the professional, the number of hours, and the hourly rate, is
7	that a disclosure to the client?
8	MS. STADLER: No. I mean, I don't know that my firm's
9	practices are before the Court, but I will tell you that
10	THE COURT: I'm just asking a question.
11	MS. STADLER: Yeah. The way that we do our engagement
12	letter says, we typically raise rates consistent with the
13	market and consistent with the expanding experience of our
14	associates.
15	THE COURT: Um-hum.
16	MS. STADLER: But my engagement letters that I sign
17	have a sentence in them that says we will not do so without
18	consulting with you first.
19	THE COURT: Okay, all right.
20	MS. STADLER: And that was in the retention agreement
21	here.
22	THE COURT: Okay. So what other issues?
23	MS. STADLER: The time increments issue
24	THE COURT: You raised the issue that people
25	
	miraculously had half-hour or full-hour time increments.

MS. STADLER: Right. And I --1 2 THE COURT: You don't think that was considered by the 3 Court when I reviewed stacks of time records? 4 MS. STADLER: I don't have any way of knowing that. THE COURT: Or by the -- so you don't think the --5 we'll find out from Mr. Masumoto whether --6 7 MS. STADLER: I did not see that issue itemized on Mr. 8 Masumoto's chart. I did just get it this morning so I may have missed it. But no, I didn't -- I don't think that was on 9 10 there. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MS. STADLER: The travel issue we've talked about in 13 the context of another professional; that's merely applying one 14 of the Court's earlier rulings. 15 THE COURT: So I'm looking at Mr. Masumoto's chart that he handed up to the Court. 16 17 MS. STADLER: Right. 18 THE COURT: I'm sure he gave you a copy this morning. 19 Okay, we're going to have to take a recess because my ECRO operator has to leave at 1:30. We're going to get a -- I 20 21 was trying to avoid having to come back, taking a lunch break, 22 and -- what's your pleasure? I would just as soon push through 23 as soon as we get another ECRO operator. Mr. Seife? 24 MR. SEIFE: That would be our preference, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Okay. So let's take a fifteen-minute

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recess and we'll pick up -- I apologize, Ms. Stadler, for
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    having to interrupt you.
             Okay? Thank you.
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         (Recess from 1:27 p.m. until 1:48 p.m.)
             THE COURT: Okay. Please be seated. Mr. Scheler, I
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    think you were -- are you done?
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             MR. SCHELER: Oh, no, I --
             THE COURT: Oh, okay. I'm sorry.
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             Go ahead, Ms. Stadler.
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             MS. STADLER: Thank you, Judge. I think we were
    just -- we left off on the issue of travel. But I do want to
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    loop back quickly. During the break I took a look at
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    something. We talked about the rate increases and the
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    seniority adjustments. And I do just want to note that the
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    seniority adjustments identified in Exhibit A-2 on the Mesirow
    objection, which is 229,000 dollars, we applied the same
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    methodology to all of the professionals. So we did make that
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    finding in Chadbourne. So Chadbourne alleged, or apparently
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    did not adjust for seniority the way that Mesirow did, to the
    extent that's pertinent to the inquiry.
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             With respect to the travel --
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             THE COURT: Yes. I do have a question. I didn't ask
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    Mr. Scheler about it, but I do have a question about travel.
24
    Go ahead.
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             MS. STADLER: I guess my only point was that I think
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there is a universe of time in there that was not objected to by the United States Trustee. I believe the United States Trustee objected to travel expenses.

We've talked about --

THE COURT: So if you look at what Mr. Masumoto handed out, the fourth interim period, it shows that the Trustee objection included travel time and expenses.

MS. STADLER: I stand corrected. It does say travel time there.

THE COURT: But it doesn't say it -- it doesn't say travel time for the other interim periods.

MS. STADLER: Correct.

THE COURT: And, actually, that I do have --

MS. STADLER: Or for the final, I guess.

THE COURT: Yes. Well, correct. And I do have a question, because I've tried to be consistent throughout the case, that where professional staff ResCap with people from other offices outside of New York, that their expenses in New York, their non-working travel time is not compensable. And it's not clear to me what Mesirow did in that regard.

MS. STADLER: It isn't clear to me either, although I will note that most of the timekeepers we identify in the exhibit do have offices in Chicago, not New York. So I believe that those entries on that exhibit do fall into the category that you previously ruled on.

THE COURT: So, I mean, look, if they were traveling to Los Angeles --

MS. STADLER: Right.

THE COURT: -- to do interviews my fifty percent rule for non-working travel time applies. If they're coming to New York to work it's not reimbursable.

MS. STADLER: Right. Exhibit G is a nine-page exhibit. Just eyeballing it looks to be mostly -- well, all travel to and from New York. From different places. Mostly Chicago, but some Boston, Miami, and Atlanta.

So obviously the time entries are what they are. It doesn't say for a deposition or for a hearing or for a meeting. But I think the identification of the items on Exhibit G reasonably fall within that ruling.

THE COURT: Yes. And I must say that it was this area of the travel expenses that you raise in your objection. I'm going to want to hear from Mr. Masumoto, because for the fourth interim period he does identify travel time and expenses as having been covered. If it was part of the resolution in that period I'm not going to double ding them by doing it again.

MS. STADLER: Right.

THE COURT: But that was the one area in your objection on Mesirow -- I'm not saying the only one -- but that was one area where I have questions. I didn't ask Mr. Scheler before, but after you speak I'll get him a chance to address

it.

MS. STADLER: Continuing down the list, we talked about the typesetting fees. I appreciate the clarification that the presentation provided regarding what typesetting actually means; apparently not the kind of typesetting we do when we file those little briefs with the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Let me just say. With respect to the non-working travel time, you identify \$565,401.50, so it's a big ticket item.

MS. STADLER: It is. And what I think we did, and let me double check the exhibit, is it was reduced by fifty percent. So the objection amount, which is 282,000 dollars --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. STADLER: -- is the other 50 percent.

THE COURT: Yes. And -- okay. I'll hear what Mr. Scheler has to say about it. I apply the fifty percent for non-working travel time; if somebody in New York is going to Chicago to do an interview or a deposition or something, yes, that rule applies. But what I've tried to be consistent in the case is staff outside of New York, that's fine, but don't charge the estate for either non-working travel time, the expenses while you're in New York, et cetera.

MS. STADLER: Right. The next group of categories, and these are all in Exhibit I to our objection, these, I think, do fall into the general heading that, using the

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Trustee's nomenclature, is "staffing issues", I think, is the
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    way they refer to it.
             You know we've broken that down a little bit more,
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    identified research that was performed at a high hourly rate
    that we believe could have been done at a lower rate.
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             Professional are analyst tasks that were --
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             THE COURT: So I'll make another confession.
             MS. STADLER: -- done at high rates.
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             THE COURT: I used to do a lot of my own research when
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    I was in practice, because I thought I could do it better than
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    those people.
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             MS. STADLER: Probably could.
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             THE COURT: My hourly rate was higher, but in the end
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    I thought it cost people a lot less money.
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             MS. STADLER: And probably faster.
             THE COURT: I knew where I was starting from.
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    don't -- the fact that more expensive timekeepers do research
    is not enough. I mean, it doesn't necessarily fall, flow down,
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    only first-year associates should do legal research.
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             MS. STADLER: No.
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             THE COURT: That's nonsense.
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             MS. STADLER: Certainly not. I would agree with that.
    I would just --
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             THE COURT: I bet you do some of your own legal
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    research too, don't you?
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MS. STADLER: Usually, because it's -- I'm faster, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. STADLER: But I would say, looking at Exhibit I-1, some of the descriptions on there, "Banking Industry Delinquency", some of the descriptions don't really suggest any particular level of sophistication is required. So the position is not senior people should never do research. It's that basic research should be performed at a lower level. And some of what's on Exhibit I certainly appeared to be more basic market conditions research than anything else.

The next category, specific category of tasks, is "Paraprofessional Staffing". That's Exhibit I-2, amounting to about 98,000 dollars. These are people charging upwards of 600 dollars an hour to create this or -- and input materials into this synthesis document system.

And I understand from the application materials that Mesirow, as a representative of Chadbourne, in this instance was keeping a document repository and was charged with keeping it updated with the documents. It's unclear to the Trust why maintenance of that database needs to be done at rates of 695, 755, and 800 dollars an hour. And that is Exhibit I-2.

Exhibit I-3 is similar. These are tasks performed by analysts that could have been performed by associates. Many of them are the same involving the synthesis document: uploading,

identifying documents, flagging documents, et cetera.

And so those are the three categories of staffing issues that the Trust has identified. And, again, unclear to me whether the United States Trustee's generic staffing objection would have encompassed those areas or not.

Finally the clawback issue. We have discussed and, again, I think adequately understand the Court's ruling in that regard. And then the multiple attendees certainly was an issue that the Trustee did raise. But, again, no indication of what the actual allocation on that deduction would have been.

THE COURT: Okay. So, by my reckoning you've raised five issues. Billing increments of half-hour or one hour, and I think you said something like twenty percent of the entries were in half-hour increments. Rate increase, seniority adjustments, travel, staffing issues, high billing rates for people doing research and multiple attendees. Those are the five issues that you're raising now.

MS. STADLER: Yes. And let me just get a quick clarification for you on the time increments. We flagged this particular timekeeper not because it was more than twenty percent of the time it was half and whole hours. It was more than forty percent of the time.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right.

Mr. Masumoto, tell me what you've -- of these five issues that Ms. Stadler is raising now, can you tell me which

ones were part of the discussions for the first four interim periods?

MR. MASUMOTO: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to the billing increments, we don't have a hard and fast rule in terms of percentages. I have, certainly, and my colleagues have certainly noted where we thought someone was billing in half and whole hour increments inappropriately. The most obvious case, if everything is billed in whole and half hour increments, but we don't have a set percentage that triggers an objection as being an improper percentage. So I can say that in this case, certainly, as we reviewed the fee application it didn't trigger an objection on our part on that issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MASUMOTO: With respect to rate increases, usually the language we require in the retention order requests that rate increases be disclosed. We don't distinguish between regular market rate increases and seniority, although as a general rule we believe that at the current time, prior to the guidelines, that both increases should be disclosed.

As far as the --

THE COURT: Well, what does that mean when you say disclosed? And the reason I focus on it, you get the billing records. I got the billing records. And it shows for each timekeeper what the hourly rate is. So if there's been an increase, there's not a separate document I look at to see

1	well, this timekeeper's rate was increased from $x$ to $y$ . I'd
2	have to look and figure it out, compare an earlier period with
3	the later period. What is it that you require?
4	MR. MASUMOTO: Generally a notice that's filed on the
5	record. Essentially, a form of the supplemental disclosure
6	that's required when the rate increase occurs.
7	THE COURT: Even for seniority increases? I was
8	certainly aware that that was your that your office's policy
9	with respect to I'll call it across the board "rate
10	increases". So the first-year associates, rather than being
11	400 now become 450 or I'm just picking random numbers.
12	MR. MASUMOTO: Your Honor, the language in the
13	retention order doesn't specify, and we had not really made
14	that specific determination, but, as a general rule we, as I
15	said, since it was intended to be general, we didn't
16	distinguish between market
17	THE COURT: Okay. Did you raise this issue with
18	Mesirow?
19	MR. MASUMOTO: Not the disclosure issue.
20	THE COURT: Okay.
21	MR. MASUMOTO: No, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. What about traveling?
23	MR. MASUMOTO: With respect to travel, as indicated on
24	our chart, I guess we did raise it during one interim. It does

25 not appear to have been raised in all of the interim periods,

but we did address the travel issue at least on one interim period.

The staffing issue, again, as mentioned, ours is somewhat general. I don't believe that our staffing inefficiency category necessarily focuses on any one specific area. It may usually be if a senior person is doing a routine matter. It may address some research issues, although, again, I'm not sure if in this particular case those issues were specifically raised.

THE COURT: It was the depths of the recession that -usually in smaller cases rather than the bigger cases -- I was
reviewing fee applications, and I would see partners billing
time for things that probably should have been done by
paralegals. And I regularly flagged those items and disallowed
them. But in the bigger cases that hasn't seemed to have been
as big a problem.

MR. MASUMOTO: Yes, Your Honor. And I think our office experiences similar things. Typically it would be purely administrative things. If those were being done by high billing partners we would certainly object.

As to the issue regarding research, it is, sort of, discretionary, depending on the nature of the research and who's doing it.

I do believe that with respect to multiple attendees we did raise that, at least on some of the applications. I'm

1	not give if in order gingle intenin newled. But the multiple
	not sure if in every single interim period. But the multiple
2	attendee issue is one that we fairly frequently and routinely
3	raised.
4	THE COURT: Okay.
5	MR. MASUMOTO: Thank you, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Thank you very much.
7	All right. Mr. Scheler, was it miraculous that one
8	timekeeper, in particular, a very, very large number of his
9	entries were in half-hour increments?
10	MR. SCHELER: No, Your Honor. I have to raise that
11	with respect to travel
12	THE COURT: I was going to go through my list in
13	order.
14	MR. SCHELER: No, but it is important. I'm going to
15	come back to travel with you.
16	THE COURT: I know. On travel you put a four-hour
17	cap.
18	MR. SCHELER: A cap. So what you're seeing is the
19	consequence of the cap.
20	THE COURT: Am I really? I mean, I
21	MR. SCHELER: Yes.
22	THE COURT: I thought there were entries that are a
23	lot less than the four hours
24	MR. SCHELER: There were some half-hour entries as
25	well. But, Your Honor, in the main what we can say is that out

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of the multitude of parties -- and there were -- I think, six
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    of the twenty entries or so were with respect to travel.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. SCHELER: Others were just -- I just -- Your
    Honor, there's no chicanery going on here --
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 6
             THE COURT: Okay.
 7
             MR. SCHELER: -- in any way, shape, or form.
             THE COURT: Well, that's what you're saying now.
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             MR. SCHELER: Yes.
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             THE COURT: Okay. What about rate increases?
             MR. SCHELER: Rate increases, Your Honor we had in
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    place that we would not do any market increases. So we capped
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    throughout the engagement. We did not undertake with the
14
    examiner to cap maturation increases. And I would note that
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    the maturation increases occurred in April, so we're talking
    about a six-week period of maturation increases.
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             Your Honor, that was fully understood and discussed
    with the examiner, and, again, from the point of view of
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    Mesirow our understanding was that we were capping on market.
             THE COURT: Okay. So -- go ahead.
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             MR. SCHELER: Yes. I think other of the professionals
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    in the case also had such rate increases.
             THE COURT: I'm not so sure about that. I think some
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24
    of them agreed not to do that.
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             MR. SCHELER: I think FTI did. I think FTI and Alix,
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1 as well.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So travel was a big -that was one that I meant to ask you about before. I was going
to -- I had a note to ask you about. It did seem to me -- was
Mesirow permitting its timekeepers to bill fifty percent for
non-working travel from wherever they were to New York?

MR. SCHELER: I think, Your Honor, once Mesirow became aware that your ruling was that that kind of travel was not reimbursable at the fifty percent rate they eliminated that. But there was a period in the case where there was some travel, and what has happened here is the Trust identified the aggregate of those, but what the Trust hasn't accounted for is that there was other travel elsewhere where we imposed the four-hour cap. So it's not --

THE COURT: Well, I don't -- it's not a tradeoff as far as I'm concerned, Mr. Scheler.

MR. SCHELER: But in the aggregate dollar amount there is a differential, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, what I am going to need to be advised about is whether the total fees which Mesirow is seeking approval for includes amounts for non-working travel to New York by people from other offices. If it's in there it has to come out of there.

I tried to be consistent throughout the case. Look, there are not that many cases that are so overwhelming that --

where the professionals needed to staff up with people from other offices. Whether they're -- and I respect their arguments that they brought people, they assigned people with the appropriate expertise. Fine. I'm all in favor of staffing from other offices. The only thing that I imposed for this case, and there could be cases where the circumstances are completely different that I might relent.

I think in this case there was an expert witness who was testifying who came from another place, but his role was as an expert witness. And I permitted the billing for the expenses to New York. And I don't think there was any non-working travel time.

But in this case I did, early on, announce that I would not reimburse for non-working travel or expenses for professionals from other offices coming to New York. If they went somewhere else to do an interview or something or document review, that's a different story.

MR. SCHELER: Your Honor, may I suggest the following?

Could we have an authorization and approval of the final

compensation net of 250,000 dollars in effect as a holdback,

subject to our --

THE COURT: Let's see where we come out --

MR. SCHELER: Okay.

THE COURT: -- on the other issues, okay? I think Ms. Stadler had indicated there was what -- 280,000 dollars that

1 she identified of --

MR. SCHELER: But that doesn't take into account the fourth interim.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's -- we'll -- I understand your request. Let's try and finish up.

What about on the staffing issues of higher billing rate people doing administrative or research tasks?

MR. SCHELER: Your Honor, as you know well, people were under the gun. There was no intention to do anything other than work efficiently. This was very senior intensive work, most especially in the latter periods, and the work that was being done, both with respect to what Ms. Stadler identified and otherwise, was achieving greater efficiencies in terms of doing the work.

So with respect to anywhere in the ordinary course on the interim basis, we certainly discuss any concerns that the U.S. Trustee had. And I think that we performed fairly and reasonably.

THE COURT: All right. What about the multiple attendees?

MR. SCHELER: Your Honor, on multiple attendees I don't think we did anything unusual. We went through all of that with the Office of the United States Trustee for certain.

And the other thing I would add, Your Honor, with respect to multiple attendees, we were working on a multitude

that --

of issues in terms of putting together the report and the
examiner's work. So what you had is, in an interesting way,
Your Honor, you had a comprehensive team working across a broad
range of issues.
At one point it was suggested, by way of example, that
Mesirow didn't have anything to do with the writing of the
report. Mesirow wrote whole sections of that report, and it
had various teams assigned to that.
THE COURT: I'm not questioning that, Mr. Scheler. Or
I'm not questioning the appropriateness of Mesirow working on
editing, reviewing this very lengthy comprehensive report.
MR. SCHELER: But even writing portions of it, Your
Honor, in various sections.
THE COURT: I'm not questioning
MR. SCHELER: So that's why you would have multiple
members of a team working on that, because the parts were
integrated.
THE COURT: Anything else you want to add?
MR. SCHELER: I guess the only thing that I would note
is that there is the best practices memo that the Lehman
examiner sent to the Office of the United States Trustee, which
by its very terms, which has become, sort of, a yard marker,
contemplates this kind of staffing. So I would just say

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THE COURT: What kind of staffing?

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MR. SCHELER: Where you would have multiple 1 2 individuals present at meetings. That's a norm for this kind 3 of work. THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Stadler, is there anything you 4 5 want to add? 6 MS. STADLER: Just to --7 THE COURT: Yes. I'll give -- Mr. Gonzalez wants to be heard too. Let me hear from Mr. Gonzalez, and then I'll 8 9 give you a chance to respond. 10 Go ahead, Mr. Gonzalez. MR. GONZALEZ: Thank you. Arthur Gonzalez, the 11 examiner. I just want to mention something about rates. It 12 13 seems to me, and this is the way I've looked at it, when a firm 14 publishes their rates they don't publish them by individual. 15 They publish them by category. Rates are categorized: first year, second year, fifth year, partner, et cetera. So when 16 17 someone moves from one category to another it's hard to imagine 18 that should be looked at as a rate increase. Because the rate 19 didn't increase. THE COURT: I mean, I have to say that this is the --20 21 MR. GONZALEZ: My response is really more focused on

MR. GONZALEZ: My response is really more focused on what Mr. Masumoto had to say about a general category that maturation in his mind, or the Office's mind, is part of the rate increase structure. It doesn't make sense to me from the standpoint when professionals file their applications and say

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our rates range from 200 dollars an hour to 1,000 dollars an
 1
 2
    hour, they're talking about categories and not which individual
    gets paid that rate.
 3
 4
             THE COURT: Yes. I was going to say in the last seven
 5
    and a half years no one, including Mr. Masumoto or anybody in
 6
    his office, has raised the issue with me about any increases,
 7
    maturation increases being inappropriate.
             Yes, I've seen the requirement that there be notice in
 8
    advance of any rate increases, but I've interpreted that to be
 9
10
    the general rate increase where you increase each -- or, if not
    every increase, when first-year associates go from x to x plus
11
12
    something.
13
             Okay? That is what I've usually considered as the
14
    rate increase, not the -- I guess it's echoing what you've
15
    said, Mr. Gonzalez, that --
                                  See, I think the argument would
16
             MR. GONZALEZ: Yes.
17
    be when someone becomes a fifth-year associate the question
    really is why is the fifth-year associate doing this work, not
18
    necessarily should they get paid at a fourth-year rate.
19
20
             THE COURT: All right.
21
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MR. GONZALEZ: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gonzalez.

Ms. Stadler?

22

23

24

25

MS. STADLER: Just wanted to touch on two points that Mr. Scheler made. On the time increments issue I just glanced

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at Exhibit B, and I found, not scientifically, about five time
 1
    entries that are 4.0 hours.
 2
             THE COURT: You know, sometimes people really do spend
 3
 4
    four hours --
 5
             MS. STADLER: Yes.
 6
             THE COURT: Oh.
 7
             MS. STADLER: But those are --
             THE COURT: You're saying that's the travel --
 8
 9
             MS. STADLER: Those are travel.
10
             THE COURT: Okay.
             MS. STADLER: I think those are the ones --
11
12
             THE COURT: All right.
13
             MS. STADLER: -- that are attributable to the travel
14
    issue.
15
             THE COURT: All right.
16
             MS. STADLER: So four out of however many, seventy-
17
    nine, on there.
18
             The other point that I wanted --
             THE COURT: You're suggesting that somebody is being
19
    dishonest when they're writing down their time in half-hour
20
21
    time increments.
22
             MS. STADLER: I think dishonest may be too hard a
23
    word. I think rounding up, possibly, is a better way to say
24
    it.
25
             THE COURT: Sometimes rounding down.
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MS. STADLER: Yes. Maybe. On the multiple attendees issue, I just wanted to point out that Exhibit K, which is the calculation of the objection amount, which is 662,000 dollars, lists the attendees at the various meetings and objects only to the fourth and fifth participants. So, in essence, it applies the rule that Your Honor has -- or the guideline Your Honor has suggested for in-court participation to internal meetings.

THE COURT: But, you see, there I didn't announce a guideline for internal meetings. The issue arose in ResCap.

It arose, I think, in MF Global, perhaps in Borders where I'd see a flock of attorneys from a debtor or creditors, debtor's firm or creditors' committee firm in court, most of them not saying a word at any point in the hearing. And that's what led me to -- and they weren't -- occasionally they'd pass a note, but for the most point they were sitting there absorbing. And I'm more than happy to have them here. Just don't charge the estate for it.

I'm not sure that I would get to the same position with respect to three or more people attending an internal meeting, because they all may well have a role to play and receive directions as to what they do carrying forward.

So I never did adopt -- and you were fair about it in your papers. You acknowledged that you were seeking to apply what I said for in-court presence to internal meetings. I

didn't adopt that for internal meetings. I could look at time entries and see -- if I looked at a bill and saw that there were nine people at a four-hour meeting I'd have real questions about it, and Mr. Masumoto would have had a real question about it too. It could be a lot less than nine, but I would be -- I am reluctant to say that the guidance -- and I think even in court I said look. If there are three more people here in anything that they are actually working on, fine. Charge for it. Okay? I didn't just say automatically you're not going to charge.

So I can remember having some fairly large team meetings in big cases where we had a lot of people there, and it was important that they be there. So I can't categorically say that there was anything wrong or inappropriate in having more people at a meeting.

That I'm not faulting you for raising, okay? It raises questions.

MS. STADLER: Right. And, I mean, the only point of my response is that the individual meetings are all identified in Exhibit K, as are the attendees and the lengths of time the meetings took. So that information is there.

THE COURT: So what I used to look for to see if six people attended the same meeting and everybody had a different amount of time down for it.

MS. STADLER: That would have showed up on the billing

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error, I think. But, yes, I mean, there --
 1
 2
             THE COURT: May I ask you this?
             MS. STADLER: I don't see any nine-hour meetings.
 3
 4
             THE COURT: With respect to the half-hour increments.
 5
             MS. STADLER: Yes.
 6
             THE COURT: Was this focused on one particular
 7
    timekeeper?
 8
             MS. STADLER: The time is all one timekeeper, yes.
             THE COURT: Who's the timekeeper?
 9
10
             MS. STADLER: Ben. Ben Wei.
             THE COURT: Spell the last name.
11
12
             MS. STADLER: W-E-I. And that, I just would note, is
13
    not because we chose to single that individual out. We
14
    filtered for, like we said, disproportionate use of the time
    increments, and that's the individual who used it more than
15
16
    forty percent of the time.
17
             THE COURT: Okay. What was his billing rate?
             MS. STADLER: Eight hundred and fifty-five dollars an
18
    hour. Title is managing director.
19
             THE COURT: And what was the total of the -- do you
20
21
    have a figure for the total fees charged in these increments,
22
    in the half-hour increments?
23
             MS. STADLER: The total was $152,617.50.
24
             THE COURT: Is that the total for just those billing
    entries that were in the half-hour increments?
25
```

1	MS. STADLER: No. That's that timekeeper's entire
2	THE COURT: Okay. Did your system filter how much he
3	charged on entries that were in half-hour increments?
4	MS. STADLER: It can filter, but we didn't do that for
5	preparing this exhibit.
6	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me come back to the
7	non-working travel time to New York.
8	What did you identify as the total I don't know
9	whether you I mean, I found the figure
10	MS. STADLER: \$282,700.75 was
11	THE COURT: Give me I'm sorry. Give me the figure
12	again. 282
13	MS. STADLER: Well, your question is what was the
14	total travel, and I'm giving you a number that is half that
15	amount.
16	THE COURT: The fifty percent. I know.
17	MS. STADLER: Yes.
18	THE COURT: I know.
19	MS. STADLER: 2
20	THE COURT: Because that's what they charged.
21	MS. STADLER: Right. \$282,700.75.
22	THE COURT: Okay. And that reflects travel to New
23	York.
24	MS. STADLER: To or from.
25	THE COURT: Well, the problem with the from is yes, if

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people are going from New York somewhere else to do work --1 MS. STADLER: Right. 2 THE COURT: -- the fifty percent for non-working 3 4 travel applies. MS. STADLER: I think in order to answer --5 6 THE COURT: Unless you're saying that it's a Chicago 7 based timekeeper, and the from "New York" is New York to 8 Chicago. He's going home. He or she are going home. MS. STADLER: Right. I will say this. Looking at 9 10 Exhibit G, a number of these timekeepers I know to be housed in 11 Chicago, and they are listing travel to and from New York. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MS. STADLER: There are some that are listing travel 14 from Dallas to New York, from Boston to New York, from 15 Minneapolis to New York, from Atlanta to New York, from 16 Washington, DC to New York. And I cannot tell you, as I stand 17 here, whether those people are housed in offices there. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MS. STADLER: I think it's mostly the Chicago travel 19 that is the kind that you're looking to identify, but it's 20 21 unclear to me, without doing some further analysis, which of 22 these trips was getting to New York to work on the case and 23 which was a trip for a purpose like a deposition or a meeting. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MS. STADLER: We can certainly supplement the record

```
with that information.
 1
 2
             THE COURT: No. Hang on.
             Okay. Anything else you want to?
 3
 4
             MS. STADLER: No, Judge.
 5
             THE COURT: Okay.
             Mr. Scheler? How much is the holdback for Mesirow?
 6
 7
             MR. SCHELER: About two million dollars.
             THE COURT: Okay. So what I have before me is Mesirow
 8
    seeking a fee award, final fee award of 39,472,705 dollars.
 9
10
             MR. SCHELER: Correct.
             THE COURT: And expenses of 344,747 dollars.
11
12
             MR. SCHELER: Yes, sir.
             THE COURT: Ms. Stadler, let me ask you another
13
14
    question. With respect to the travel time, did you find any
15
    entries suggesting that the Chicago-based professionals, that
    there are expenses for travel to New York for professionals
16
17
    based in offices outside of New York, either hotel, airfare, et
18
    cetera?
19
             MS. STADLER: Yes. I believe that the entries in
    Exhibit G are also accompanied by travel expenses.
20
21
             THE COURT: Okay. Here is what I'm going to do.
22
    going to sustain in part and overrule in part the objection of
    the Trust to the final fee and expense application of Mesirow.
23
    I'm going to approve the fee request of 39,472,705 dollars
24
```

subject to a continued holdback of 500,000 dollars. And I

25

don't know. I think that's overkill, but that's what I'm going to do.

And I expect that -- and the expenses, I think, if I didn't say, out of 344,747 dollars -- 344,747 dollars, the 500,000-dollar holdback is to cover fees and expenses for the following items, and I expect that Mesirow -- either through you, Mr. Scheler, or otherwise -- will communicate with Mr. Masumoto and Ms. Stadler, and see if you can come to an agreement -- provide the data and come to an agreement with respect to the amount of nonworking travel time for professionals based outside of New York, traveling to or from New York.

And likewise, a reduction in expenses for non-New York-based professionals coming to New York, because I've said, in this case at least, I'm happy to have people from other offices come here, but their expenses while here is part of overhead, so that the expense number of 344,747 needs to be reduced by any amount of expenses for professionals from other offices for while they were in New York or their airfare. And the fees need to be reduced by any of the nonworking travel time to or from New York for those professionals.

My award of fees and expenses will not be final until that adjustment is made, but the only holdback will be this 500,000-dollar figure, which I think should more than adequately --

1	MR. SCHELER: It's very cushioned.
2	THE COURT: cover the items we're talking about.
3	And that's not an invitation, Ms. Stadler, to insist
4	that it be a 500,000-dollar adjustment, okay?
5	MS. STADLER: Understood.
6	THE COURT: It just I want to be comfortable that
7	because I don't have the hard figures
8	MR. SCHELER: Your Honor, what I will undertake that
9	Mesirow will do, is that we will go back through every one of
10	our charges to determine, with respect to travel to and from
11	New York by our professionals, the aggregate amounts that were
12	included in our fee number, and we will include the aggregate
13	amounts of hotel and related expenses for when those
14	professionals were in New York. And we will submit those
15	schedules as the earliest possible date.
16	THE COURT: Well, see if you could confer with Mr.
17	Masumoto and Ms. Stadler and see if you can reach a resolution
18	of that, and then
19	MR. SCHELER: What about but I
20	THE COURT: and if you can't, you'll inform
21	MR. SCHELER: Yes, but what I'm saying to
22	THE COURT: I want to give you a chance to see if you
23	can work this out before you come back to me, okay?
24	MR. SCHELER: But what I'm saying to Your Honor is
25	that whatever we're going to present is going to be absolutely

1 factual.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHELER: So the only question will be is somehow if they look at the materials we provided, we've missed somebody. But it's going to be factual, and it's going to be consistent with what you've just ruled.

THE COURT: Okay, so let me just address -- so that's the travel related.

On multiple attendees, I'm going to overrule the Trust's objection. On the staffing issues, higher billing rate, people doing work that arguably could be done by lower-rate people, I'm going to overrule the objection. I'm sensitive to this issue of efficiency. I'm also sensitive to the time constraints that everybody was operating under, and the fact that I think I can do legal research better than my law clerks, even as good as they are, and I don't have a billing rate anymore, but when I did -- so I don't think that the Trust carried its burden on that issue.

On the rate increases, I'm unpersuaded by the -- I'm going to overrule the objection. We're talking about the seniority adjustments, and I take -- Mr. Scheler said, well, we're talking about a six-week period, so I don't think the number would be a very big number and I'm not -- whenever I have seen in a fee -- in a retention application, I've seen what associates at different levels or professionals at

1	different levels are billed at; with maturity they move up to a
2	different level. And I think if the U.S. Trustee wants to
3	preclude that from happening, they can require it in the
4	retention order.
5	Okay, with respect to Mr. Wei.
6	Ms. Stadler, you had how many time entries that were
7	in half-hour increments? I think you told me that number.
8	MS. STADLER: There were sought seventy-nine time
9	entries total recorded by this timekeeper.
10	THE COURT: And were six of those that were the four-
11	hour
12	MS. STADLER: Well, yeah, I don't don't hold me to
13	that. Those are eyeballing. Six or eight.
14	MR. SCHELER: There are six entries, which are located
15	in rows 322, 23, 39, 61 and 79. So six of thirty-four entries
16	were travel, so that brings down the
17	THE COURT: I thought it was seventy-nine entries.
18	MR. SCHELER: The total of seventy-nine.
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	MS. STADLER: All his
21	MR. SCHELER: Okay, his all of his entries were
22	seventy-nine.
23	THE COURT: Okay.
24	MR. SCHELER: Not all of them were in the
25	THE COURT: Not all increment even half-hours.
l l	

1	MR. SCHELER: So there's only thirty-four that were in
2	the half-hour range, and of the thirty-four, six. So you get
3	down to the twenty-eight of those entries.
4	THE COURT: All right. The objection's overruled.
5	MR. SCHELER: Thank you, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: I'm not faulting you for flagging the
7	issue, Ms. Stadler.
8	All right, I think that disposes of the Mesirow
9	application. With respect to the adjustments, I'm not sure
10	I don't think we need to have an in-court hearing. You're in
11	Wisconsin. If you can come to an agreement, put it in the form
12	of a stipulation. If you can't, we'll do a telephone hearing,
13	so you don't have to travel to New York for it. Okay?
14	MR. SCHELER: That'll be fine, Your Honor, thank you.
15	THE COURT: All right, thanks, Mr. Scheler.
16	MR. SCHELER: Thank you.
17	THE COURT: We still have Morrison Cohen.
18	MR. SEIFE: Your Honor, yes, and we still have the
19	examiner's final application.
20	THE COURT: Oh, there were no objections. It's
21	approved.
22	MR. SEIFE: Would you like me to put the amount on the
23	record, Your Honor?
24	THE COURT: Sure, why don't you do that?
25	MR. SEIFE: Howard Seife, Chadbourne & Parke. The

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examiner, Arthur J. Gonzalez, final fee request is $568,612.50,
 1
 2
    and no expenses.
             THE COURT: Right. And that is approved.
 3
 4
             MR. SEIFE: Thank you, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Okay. All right. Morrison Cohen.
 5
 6
             MR. DAKIS: Last, but certainly not least, Your Honor,
 7
    Morrison Cohen is here seeking final fees --
             THE COURT: Tell me -- you have to make your
 8
 9
    appearance.
10
             MR. DAKIS: Oh, sorry, apologies, Your Honor. Robert
11
    Dakis from Morrison Cohen.
12
             THE COURT: Tell -- your last name again?
13
             MR. DAKIS: Dakis, D-A-K-I-S.
14
             THE COURT: Thanks, go ahead.
             MR. DAKIS: Your Honor, Morrison Cohen filed a final
15
    fee application seeking $4,212,750.50. Morrison Cohen has
16
17
    agreed to a reduction with the U.S. Trustee of $17,524.08. And
18
    in response to concerns raised by the Trust in the Trust's
19
    objection, we've agreed to an additional reduction of
    $33,709.50, bringing our total fee request to $4,163,466.92. I
20
21
    think that's slightly lower than what's on the chart before
22
    Your Honor. I think the chart doesn't reflect the additional
23
    30,000 dollars we took in our response to the Trust's
24
    objection.
25
             Much of what I was prepared to say here today has been
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covered both by the Court and by other professionals who have stood up and spoke, and so I'll limit my remarks, but there is a word that came up that Judge Gonzalez raised, and I think a good lawyer listens to the judge, and listens to former judges when they speak. And the word is "amnesia". And I think that's an appropriate word to describe the Trust's objection to Morrison Cohen's fee applications.

The Trust's objection is predicated on a central focus that the independent directors in the case weren't very important, and therefore weren't entitled to the level of representation they were receiving. And I believe that that central premise is, simply put, faulty, flawed and just wrong. Your Honor, as the Court recognized and as the parties recognized, the independent directors ran the company as -- the time the case filed. The independent directors were a majority of the board; the independent directors negotiated the initial settlement with Ally Bank.

That initial settlement, while raised through the mediation process that the independent directors participated in, also led to certain noncash compensation, including a DIP, the use of cash collateral, the shared servicing agreement, and all of the various agreements between Ally and the debtors that permitted the debtors to continue to operate through their Chapter 11, to continue to originate mortgages until the time of the sale. And the sale itself was overseen by the

independent directors.

The climate of this case at the outset was one of acrimony. The creditors' committee and other constituents in the case challenged, at every point, the actions of the debtors and the debtors' management. Central to that challenge was the relationship between the debtors' board and Ally Bank. And as such, in the middle of all of this disputes, was a group of independent directors who had no ties to Ally, who were trying to make decisions in the best interest of the estate, and for the most part, apparently succeeded.

And it's those decisions that led to ultimately the -the results of this case, led to the appointment of Lew Kruger
as CRO. It led to the plan mediation process. And ultimately,
it led to the independent directors agreeing to give up 150
million dollars of their own insurance in order for Ally to up
their contribution, which became the final piece of the
settlement puzzle.

Throughout that process, the independent directors looked to their independent counsel for advice, and it was a necessity that their independent counsel be involved in every feature of this case in order for them to ultimately make a decision and assist their clients in deciding to give up their rights to indemnification from Ally and their right to insurance. It would have been malpractice for a firm to sit back and say, yes, give up insurance, give up indemnification,

without being fully versed in where the case was and where the case was going.

In addition, the creditors' committee had raised -brought a 2004 application that sought document discovery.

That document discovery necessarily looked to documents in the hands of the independent directors. In addition, the independent directors were called as witnesses in the RMBS trial, and so the independent directors would have been part of the RMBS trial, had that gone forward, had the case ultimately not settled.

So ultimately, the independent directors looked to their counsel to take a more active role in this case than perhaps the Trust would have liked, but it is not a role that was unnecessary given the acrimony, given the tenor of this case, and given, ultimately, how the case was resolved.

Now, in response to the Trust's objections, Morrison Cohen has agreed to take certain reductions. In particular, Your Honor, Morrison Cohen has agreed to take a 513-dollar reduction for duplicate time entries. Through our review of the actual bills that were filed, we did locate two duplicate time entries, and we have decided to write them off. In addition, Morrison Cohen inadvertently raised rates of certain para --

THE COURT: .9 hours by Michael Connolly on November 11th, 2013.

MR. DAKIS: Yes, Your Honor.

In addition, Your Honor, we located 17,000 dollar -17,190 dollars of rate increases in paraprofessional time.

That was inadvertent. It was done through a coding error, and we are agreeing to write those charges off.

The Trust has identified 2,279 dollars of billing activities that were done by a paralegal in the early stages of the case. We have agreed to write that time off.

Transient time, which the Court and the U.S. Trustee has looked at with respect to Morrison Cohen, is an interesting thing. We had certain lawyers who were involved in the very pre-petition transactions that the examiners were looking at that were the subject of the inquiry by the creditors' committee and by other parties in the case. And so Morrison Cohen had the unique benefit of at times being able to walk down to the lawyer who wrote the board resolution at issue or walk down to the lawyer's office who wrote the document at issue, and ask them, hey, what was this about?

And so there were two lawyers that were involved in pre-petition representation of the board, David Lerner and Eitan Tabak, both of whom didn't spend a considerable amount of time on the case, but the time they spent was valuable, because it allowed us to get to historical information about the debtors quickly. One lawyer we staffed, a junior associate, on a document review project; that was 2,695 dollars of time.

We've agreed to write that off.

THE COURT: Sometimes when you -- the people who are working on the case need to get some information about historical information, they pick up the phone; they call the lawyer who worked on it. He tells them, oh, I wrote that back then, and it doesn't get billed, because it wasn't work in connection with the case. It's just an explanation of what was done that the lawyers currently working on the case needed to know.

appropriate charge. It's not a whole lot of money. But I just have a question whether it's an appropriate charge to the case to have a lawyer who's not working on it charge time because he answered a question to somebody who is working on it about something he did -- he or she did -- historically; not because this person is the world's leading tax expert on some subsection of a subsection of a code and the best way to get an answer is call the -- because you have that issue, call the tax lawyer who deals with the issue. That's not the same -- and ask for legal input; not, there's this resolution I think you worked on. Tell me what it means or why was it done?

MR. DAKIS: I certainly can understand the Court's concern with that. And that was minimized by the ability to staff the people who actually worked on the case -- for the most part on the case. And so Michael Connolly, who had the

most historic knowledge of the debtors, actually worked on the case, so we didn't run into these types of issues.

But with one lawyer in particular, David Lerner, who spent the most -- who is the bulk of the challenged transitory time, David Lerner was intimately involved with the debtors' pre-petition activities. And he also provided guidance post-petition on corporate governance issues. And so it was good to be able to speak to somebody who was providing how the debtors did a pre-petition, but also being able to turn to us and say, and maybe now this is where we should be trying to steer things. It was essential, especially given that, again, the ultimate resolution here was that the board was going to give up their ability to look to D&O insurance, and to look to indemnification from Ally and the debtors.

And so while I certainly appreciate that if we were just picking up the phone and calling somebody and saying, hey, what did we do here and what does that resolution mean? The advice here given by the allegedly transitory timekeeper went to history, and is the history is why we called, but the estate got more than just history from that. We got guidance. And so it was important that we were able to look to Mr. Lerner.

The Trust has also identified 6,742 dollars of what the Trust believes are administrative time. In -- the Trust's administrative time category is both time that we will say is administrative for the purposes of trying to reach a

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resolution. I'm not sure we would concede that it's
 1
 2
    administrative. But also in that time are entries by our
    specialists dealing with litigation databases for coding and
 3
 4
    putting documents into that database.
             THE COURT: Well, as I understand it, you've agreed to
 5
    a 6,742-dollar reduction for items that might be considered
 6
 7
    administrative?
             MR. DAKIS: Yes, Your Honor. And in that category is
 8
    also items that are just clearly not administrative.
 9
10
    They're -- within that category of administrative costs --
             THE COURT: Let me see if I can -- what I want to
11
    focus on -- what's still in dispute as opposed to what you've
12
13
    agreed -- whether you had to or not, you've agreed to reduce
14
    that 6,742 dollars. But what I want to focus on, particularly
15
    given that it's a quarter to 3, is what's still in dispute?
             MR. DAKIS: Certainly, Your Honor. I believe it's
16
17
    three large categories, and the Trust can speak to anything
18
    that I miss here. But it's multiple attendees at meetings and
    court hearings, and internal meetings, I believe, are the two
19
    largest.
20
21
             THE COURT: The U.S. Trustee called you on every, I
22
    think -- maybe there was one interim period where it didn't
23
    arise. The second interim period is the only time that Mr.
24
    Masumoto has not reflected the objection about multiple
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attendees.

MR. DAKIS: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Maybe your firm didn't get the message, because I kept saying at hearings, I'm not going to compensate for multiple attendees, but you just kept sending people.

MR. DAKIS: Well, it was -- these were internal meetings, but -- and so the message was somewhat mixed as to whether or not, and how many lawyers could be staffed at internal meetings, but we got the message ultimately, Your Honor. And we went back through our time and the final fee application reflects a reduction even for those periods where the U.S. Trustee didn't ask for it. So we went back to the second period --

THE COURT: The U.S. Trustee's even objected in the fifth interim period for multiple attendees.

MR. DAKIS: It was -- at that time, Your Honor, it was a paralegal who came down to court for a day, and we missed it, and just didn't write off the time, and once the U.S. Trustee brought it to our attention, we wrote the time off. But that wasn't the same level of staffing that had raised the objections beforehand. We had wrote down all the time for anybody above -- I believe it's three timekeepers -- at every internal meeting going back to the outset of the case, so that we insured that the U.S. Trustee and this Court's guidance was covered.

THE COURT: Okay.

1	MR. DAKIS: Similarly, with respect to hearings.
2	THE COURT: That included internal meetings, not just
3	court hearings?
4	MR. DAKIS: Absolutely.
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	MR. DAKIS: Court hearings, what we we tried to
7	mainly staff court hearings as best as we could, and brought
8	only those lawyers that were necessary. Morrison Cohen uses an
9	interdisciplinary approach, as I'm sure every law firm tells
10	you they do, but Morrison Cohen
11	THE COURT: Considering you didn't have any speaking
12	role in court; you just had a lot of observers sitting around.
13	MR. DAKIS: Mr. Moldovan had to speak, I think, a
14	couple of times.
15	THE COURT: There are transcripts that you can
16	somebody can get, but I'm always happy to have people in the
17	courtroom.
18	MR. DAKIS: Thank you, Your Honor. It at times,
19	given the speed in which the case was moving and the number of
20	board meetings, and the information that was being flowed to
21	the board, waiting for a transcript to come out and reading a
22	transcript was would have been less efficient then simply
23	having somebody listen to the hearing. And given that some of
24	the hearings dealt with discovery issues that directly impacted
25	the independent directors, it was prudent to send attorneys

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THE COURT: What other categories do you still have issues with?

MR. DAKIS: It's internal meetings and multiple attendees. Oh, and there's one other one, Your Honor, regarding research. Morrison Cohen, at the request of the independent directors, performed research on a particular topic. The topic was equitable subordination.

The research was performed at a time before the settlement was done, and the purpose of the research was the independent directors were looking to where their levers were ultimately going to be, to the extent that the then pending mediation wasn't successful. The independent directors were still looking to try to get this ultimately to a plan, and ultimately to hopefully a confirmation hearing.

And as part of that, the independent directors felt that they were the parties that were the most -- that were in the best position, given the overlay between Ally and --

THE COURT: Who --

MR. DAKIS: -- the debtors themselves.

THE COURT: Who were trying to equitably subordinate?

MR. SEIFE: We were looking at the Ally claims, Your

Honor. And so the question was whether or not we had any leverage against the parent, and it was the pre-petition

25 special committee of independent directors who was tasked

directly with examining the Ally claims that ultimately led to the pre-petition settlement.

So in furtherance of that responsibility, they asked their counsel to look at equitable subordination of the Ally claims to determine, in the event that there wasn't going to be a settlement, whether or not there was a lever there that they could use, and ultimately the case settled. And once the settlement was announced and was finalized in May, we stopped the research immediately.

THE COURT: All right. Any other issues that you're still disagreeing about?

MR. DAKIS: None that come to mind, but I'm sure the Trust will remind us of anything.

THE COURT: Okay, let me hear from Ms. Stadler. Thank you very much.

MR. DAKIS: Thank you.

MS. STADLER: Thank you, Judge. Morrison Cohen is not an examiner's professional. And whatever may be said about the unique circumstances of an examiner under Chapter 11, the same cannot typically be said for independent directors of a debtor. The debtor and its board of directors, including the independent directors, were represented in these cases by a long list of professionals that have been granted final fee applications today.

THE COURT: Look, there was -- from day one of this

case, the major issues arose from intercompany transactions with the nondebtor ultimate parent, Ally Financial. From day one of this case, when there was a proposed pre-petition plan support agreement, opposed from day one by -- well, it wasn't day one; there wasn't a creditors' committee on day one -- but from the appointment of the creditors' committee on, that agreement was opposed. And it does seem to me that Mr. Dakis is right; that the independent directors of Residential Capital had very direct and strong interests in what are the responsibilities of directors of a debtor. This is long before Mr. Kruger was appointed as the CRO, and he didn't totally supplant the directors, but he had an important role.

You're not getting much traction from me on the research issue. I mean, you put in the declaration of -- what's his name?

MS. STADLER: John Dubel?

THE COURT: Yes, John Dubel, who testified in my courtroom. He was a very impressive witness. And -- but he was a member of the creditors' committee. He wasn't part of the debtors' management. He wasn't a director of the debtor. He had a very different stake. He was the head of FGIC at the time, and negotiated the settlement with the debtors and the dispute with FGIC. And impressive guy, experienced, but with a very different interest in the case than the independent directors of ResCap.

And so I have a hard time having you or Mr. Dubel substitute your judgment for the judgment of Morrison Cohen and the independent directors about what the appropriate -- what should have been -- what should the lawyers for those independent directors do in connection with the case.

Equitable subordination, for a time, looked like it was going to be a big issue in this case. And Mr. Dakis' explanation of why they were looking at it, from the standpoint of -- because Ally had a big claim -- it makes sense to me. Tell me why that doesn't make sense?

MS. STADLER: Well, I will push back a little bit on this one, just because, Judge, you shared with us your anger on some of the issues that these applications raised, and this application is one that really raises anger on the part of the Trust, because of the -- there is absolutely no dispute that the independent directors themselves played an important role in this case. And their involvement in the negotiation of the pre-petition plan support agreement and all of the issues that arose out of that, including the examiner's investigation, was a narrow issue where their interests diverged from that of the company.

But in most other respects -- and this is the point of the Dubel declaration -- as a participant in this case and other restructurings, in most respects, the independent directors' interests are adequately protected by the debtors'

counsel, and I think the Ally subordination research is a 1 perfect example of that. Why did Morrison Cohen need to spend 2 90,000 dollars researching equitable subordination, which was a 3 4 huge issue in the case for the debtor and everyone else? We didn't review -- I personally did not look at Morrison & 5 6 Foerster's application, but I suspect if we did, you would see 7 there was research going on on behalf of the debtor on that 8 issue. And the issue that the Trust takes with the Morrison 9 10 Cohen participation has nothing to do with the independent 11 directors themselves and their role. It has to do with their 12 need to be separately represented, separate and apart from the

THE COURT: Well, there wasn't --

company and the board of directors and the CRO --

MS. STADLER: -- on issues --

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THE COURT: There wasn't a CRO at the start of the case.

MS. STADLER: Right, but later the CRO. Separate and apart from him on matters of routine Chapter 11 practice. And that is why the exhibits that are key to this discussion are really I and J. Mr. Dakis is incorrect. We don't have meetings and court appearances lumped together. Exhibit I is broken down into many categories, including court attendance. This is things like first-day motions, first-day hearings.

THE COURT: It wasn't until a little later in the case

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that I set out my guideline about how many lawyers in the
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    courtroom were getting --
             MS. STADLER: Right.
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             THE COURT: -- there would be compensation for. So --
             MS. STADLER: Attending the JSN trial, confirmation
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    hearing, all of these things; and then we have board meetings.
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    We have two and three Morrison Cohen lawyers sitting in on the
    call every time the board met. The board, which except for in
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    these narrow issues where the independent directors' interests
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10
    diverged, was adequately represented by very experienced
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    Chapter 11 counsel. Attendance at the auction -- obviously the
    examiner meeting and interviews were the area where special
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    attention and separate representation was required. That's
    29,000 dollars of this entire category.
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             THE COURT: How much was charged for attendance of the
    JSN trial? Two trials.
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17
             MS. STADLER: Yeah.
                                  I do apologize --
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             THE COURT: That's all right.
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             MS. STADLER: -- this is about a thirty-page exhibit
    so without a search function, it's going to be a little bit
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21
           There were three people at various portions of the
    hard.
22
    October 23rd, 2013 JSN trial.
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             THE COURT: That was the Phase I trial?
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             MS. STADLER: There were one, two, three, four, five
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people at the November 19th trial, which is described by at

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least one of the timekeepers as the Phase II trial.

THE COURT: It was the combined Phase II and confirmation trial.

MS. STADLER: And confirmation, right. So there were five people at that one.

And the important -- I want to continue briefly -- board meetings was the other category in Exhibit I which really, most directors on routine board meetings don't need counsel present, much less --

THE COURT: Hard to say any board meeting in here --

MS. STADLER: -- separate counsel.

THE COURT: -- was routine.

MS. STADLER: The auction we talked about, and then the discovery. And then committee meetings and claims meetings, that's the category of objections that's a multiple attendees at outside events, and it amounts to more than 300,000 dollars; \$337,991.50 to be exact.

I want to make a point, because here's one area where we can clearly say this is not the same objection that the trustee made. The trustee objected to three and up. On most of these categories except the auction, we had -- we allowed one and deducted the second or third participant, and that's where the 337 number comes from. So that is granting them the need to have someone at each and every one of those things, but one person rather than two or three.

Now, the next exhibit is Exhibit J. This is the internal meetings, and this, I understand, is a different category. And I agree with you, workflow meetings and making sure that everybody's getting the same information at the same time makes perfect sense in some of these types of engagements. This is another 315,000 dollars in internal conferencing and meeting among these people who were already sitting two, three and four at a time in every proceeding. So it appears a lot less important given the role of the independent directors and their counsel, as independent counsel as opposed to debtors' counsel, that they would need to have such a high level of internal conferencing.

So those are the two big nuts, so to speak, on this list. The ones that Mr. Dakis addressed already or that the Trustee has addressed, I think, the vague -- clearly our universe of vague task descriptions is much larger than what the Trustee would have raised or objected to. But again, no way to really determine which deductions were allocated to which vague task. The research we have talked about -- the transient timekeepers, I will just note, because I was following along --

THE COURT: Transitory timekeepers.

MS. STADLER: Transitory timekeepers. I will just note that one of the things David Lerner billed for -- because we were just talking about this, it struck my eye -- was two

hours on one day and an hour -- 1.8 hours on another day to review the examiner's report. I'm not sure how that would relate to his prior experience in corporate governance with the debtor. But with that, I will sit down, as I know everyone's patience is running thin for this process.

Thank you.

THE COURT: So the examiner's report in a number of places -- I don't have it in front of me -- raised questions about pre-petition transactions, related-party transactions that this debtor engaged in. And I think -- I'm -- without the report in front of me, never fully resolved what the basis for doing those transactions -- why wasn't counsel for the independent directors who were involved in passing on those transactions, why wasn't it appropriate for -- and some of the -- and they covered -- some of this stuff is in the examiner's report. Why isn't it appropriate for counsel to the independent directors to look and see what the examiner said about pre-petition transactions, related-party transactions as to which independent directors voted?

MS. STADLER: These professionals had billed substantially to prepare the witnesses for the examiner interviews and to attend those interviews and in some cases --

THE COURT: Let's --

MS. STADLER: -- attend trial.

THE COURT: Until the plan was confirmed, there was no

assurance that the compromises reflected in the second plan support agreement would be confirmed in a plan. And so if everything had blown up the way the JSNs wanted it to, wouldn't the independent directors have faced the risk of breach of fiduciary duty claims in connection with pre-petition transactions they had approved?

I mean, the fact that -- I mean, I think it was more than prurient interest that would lead counsel for the independent directors to look at what the examiner included in the report. There's stuff in that report that specifically dealt with related-party transactions pre-petition that were approved by the board, the independent directors. So why isn't it appropriate? I mean, you're complaining about Mr. Lerner spending -- it took me a lot longer than a couple of hours to read all 2,245 pages, but I read it all.

MS. STADLER: Fair. That's fair.

THE COURT: It's well indexed and you could -- and also if you open it electronically, it is easily searchable.

But --

MS. STADLER: Right. I think this goes back in general to the basic issue of was counsel limiting its involvement to issues where the board of directors as a whole was not -- had interests that were somehow divergent from these independent directors with their separate counsel. And again, I raise that issue not for any other purpose than to just give

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a flavor of the types of activities that show up on Exhibit H,
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    because with all of the paper flying around, it's easy to lose
    sight of these things.
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             I do want to make one more point as a whole in the
    context of this application. The notion of the fee application
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    processes; certainly, you evaluate the fees for reasonableness
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    and necessity at the time that they were rendered. But the 330
    analysis is really designed to get at the inquiry of whether
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    professional services provided delivered value to the case,
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10
    delivered --
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             THE COURT: As of the time --
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             MS. STADLER: -- value to the estate.
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             THE COURT: As of the time the services were
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    performed.
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             MS. STADLER: Correct.
             THE COURT: So it may be easy for you or for me to say
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    now that that shouldn't have been a real concern of the
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    independent directors or counsel to the independent directors.
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    You know, hindsight makes it much easier. But viewed as of the
    time that the services were performed, it's not so clear.
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21
             Well, other issues you want to raise?
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             MS. STADLER: No. I think we've been through them
23
    all.
          Thank you.
24
             THE COURT: Okay.
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Mr. Dakis, you want to respond? When you get to

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respond, I've got to tell you that there are -- I'm troubled by the size of the Morrison Cohen fees and the -- you didn't represent an active stakeholder in the bankruptcy proceeding, creditors' committee, debtor. Important representation, I don't dispute that, but your firm is seeking, with the adjustments agreed to with the U.S. Trustee, \$4,195,226.42 in fees for representing the independent directors.

It's a big number for not representing one of the active stakeholders in the case. And when you drill down into how that number was built up, it's not clear to me why two, three or four people should be compensated for something that one person could have done.

I mean, I'm not -- I disagree with Ms. Stadler's -- to some of her arguments; the equitable subordination research, I disagree with her about that. I mean, I viewed -- viewing the case in its entirety, the issues that rose and fell as the case went on; very contentious case early on -- contentious about issues that could potentially impact the independent directors. There was a need -- it was appropriate for them to have independent legal counsel. I don't dispute that. But to me, that doesn't justify three, four or five people at a board meeting or three, four or five people in court or three -- or sitting through the JSN trial. Why did people sit through the

MR. DAKIS: Your Honor, the JSN trial became important

to the independent directors because, as Your Honor noted, at 1 2 that time, there was a settlement in place. But if the JSNs were able to blow the settlement up and blow the plan up, it 3 4 was the board that was going to be sued. I mean, ultimately this entire case --5 6 THE COURT: How many people sat through the JSN or 7 appeared -- were present during the JSN trial? MR. DAKIS: During the JSN trial? 8 9 THE COURT: Yes. 10 MR. DAKIS: It would have been either David Piedra or myself, for most. Mr. Moldovan might have appeared for some of 11 12 it. There was never more than two until the confirmation hearing. 13 14 At the confirmation hearing -- on the first day of the 15 confirmation hearing, I believe we had five attorneys. We wrote that down to three. On the second day of the 16 17 confirmation hearing, we might have had four; we would have 18 wrote that down to three.

THE COURT: You weren't -- you didn't represent a party in the JSN trial. There was transcript -- there was daily transcript from the JSN trial.

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MR. DAKIS: There were also daily board meetings about the JSN trial at the end, Your Honor. We were in constant communication with the independent directors who wanted to know, ultimately, where are we going; are we going to get sued.

And to sit back at the end of a trial, at the end of the day, and not be able to turn to the client and say okay, here's what happened, here's where you are, here's where the case is, would have put us at a disadvantage with the client and would have put the very people who were trying to guide the process through -- and ultimately would have been the parties who were in front of Your Honor at whatever breach of fiduciary duty litigation would have been started at the time of the process stopped, had it not been successful -- would have put them at a disadvantage as to exactly where they stood.

I concede, Your Honor, that in a normal case, and what is a normal case in Chapter 11 -- I think we've all yet to see every case's nuance. But in other cases, it certainly might not be as appropriate to have independent counsel to the independent directors of the board be as involved as Morrison Cohen was. But from day one of this case, it was the judgment of these board -- of these directors, of the independent directors that was called into question. It was the independent directors who negotiated the deals with Ally. Their judgment was assailed from the second that a creditors' committee came in.

It was the independent directors who approved the various pre-petition transactions that were the very subject of the examiner's report that was called into question.

THE COURT: Many of which the examiner concluded had a

high probability of success.

MR. DAKIS: Yes. And -- well, I'm not so sure that the examiner concluded that many of them had a high probability of success, but --

THE COURT: It didn't take that many, you know. They were big-dollar items.

MR. DAKIS: But the point stands, Your Honor, that these are the parties that, while they were not a direct economic stakeholder, they were a stakeholder in this case more so than independent directors might have been in other cases. In this case, it was --

THE COURT: Okay, stop.

MR. DAKIS: -- about the independent directors.

THE COURT: I'm going to take this one under submission. I'm going to enter an order with respect to the amount of the fees that are going to be -- fees and expenses that are going to be approved for Morrison Cohen. I want to go back and look at some of the underlying billing records in the exhibits attached to Ms. Stadler's objection. I'm not writing an opinion on it; I'm going to enter an order.

With respect to all of the professionals whose fees I approved today -- I didn't necessarily say it at the time when I was resolving the objections that the trust raised. Ms. Stadler had used this term earlier about using the holistic approach, and I've tried to do that. I've looked at the

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entire -- I've lived through this case. I've lived through
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    what the issues were at various times. I've lived through each
    of the -- more than live through; I've reviewed the fee
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 4
    applications. I looked to the U.S. Trustee for its view on it.
             The amount of fees being sought by Morrison Cohen for
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    representation of the independent directors is a very large
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    number for the role it had in this case. I don't doubt the
    importance of the work that was being done, and I'm not saying
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    I won't approve it in the amounts requested. But I want to go
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    back -- I am going to go back and look at it again. I'm
    sufficiently concerned about this one. I want to be sure I get
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    it right.
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             So I'm going to take it under submission.
             MR. DAKIS: Understood, Your Honor. I would just note
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    for the record that in our response to the fee committee's --
    to the Trust's objection, we provided a counter exhibit that
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    goes through the multiple attendees at hearings and at meetings
18
    that explains why each individual timekeeper was at each
19
    individual meeting. So to the extent that's useful --
             THE COURT: All right. Just give me a second. I want
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21
    to look at one other -- here, I have here --
22
         (Pause)
             THE COURT: All right, thank you.
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Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MARINUZZI: Your Honor, that's the end of the

MR. DAKIS:

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1	agenda. Just housekeeping; we have to reach out to Weir &
2	Partners about the 154-dollar expense, and I believe Kramer
3	Levin will reach out to Epiq. Assuming we can get quick
4	responses, we'll include those numbers in the form of order
5	that covers all of the professionals except, I guess, for
6	Morrison Cohen. If we're unable to get a quick response, then
7	I would suggest, Your Honor, if it's okay with chambers, we'd
8	submit an order that covers all of the professionals but Weir,
9	Epiq, and Morrison Cohen, and then we'll try to close the loop
10	on those.
11	THE COURT: What I'm fussing about is such a small
12	number, but it just
13	MR. MARINUZZI: Understood. Thank you, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
15	MR. MARINUZZI: Thank you.
16	THE COURT: We're adjourned.
17	MR. AGRUSA: Hello?
18	THE COURT: Yes.
19	MR. AGRUSA: Yes, I'm sorry, Your Honor. My name is
20	Mike Agrusa and I represent Towers Watson. We were on the
21	agenda. I did not hear anything regarding our
22	THE COURT: I approved it.
23	MR. AGRUSA: fee or our expenses that were
24	requested.
25	THE COURT: I approved it.

## RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC, ET AL.

189

	RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC, ET AL.
1	MR. AGRUSA: I'm sorry. I must not have heard that.
2	Thank you very much.
3	THE COURT: Don't charge anybody for sticking around
4	until now. That got approved fairly early.
5	MR. AGRUSA: Thank you.
6	THE COURT: We're adjourned.
7	(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 3:14 PM)
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1				
2	INDEX			
3				
4	RULINGS			
5		age	Line	
6	Bradley Arant, final fees in the amount of	51	8	
7	\$11,456,954.36 and expenses of \$613,321.35			
8	are approved.			
9	Bryan Cave, final fees of \$279,187.50 and	51	17	
10	expense of \$116.60 are approved			
11	Carpenter Lipps, final fees of \$6,163,315	51	19	
12	and expenses of \$2,609,058.89, is approved			
13	Centerview Partners, LLC, final fees,	51	23	
14	\$5,700,000 as the fees and \$3,800,000 as the	<b>)</b>		
15	transaction fee, expenses of \$67,336.36, are	<u>.</u>		
16	approved.			
17	Curtis Mallet, fees of \$9,847,770.80 and	52	1	
18	expenses of \$53,990.94 (as amended later),			
19	are approved.			
20	Deloitte, fees of \$5,497,620.65 are	52	3	
21	approved.			
22	Dorsey Whitney, fees of \$812,063.65 and	52	5	
23	expenses of \$5,480.03, are approved.			
24	Ernst & Young, fees of \$1,884,808.75 and	52	7	
25	expenses of \$43,230.48, are approved			

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2	RULINGS		
3	Page	Line	
4	Fortace, LLC, fees in the amount of 52	9	
5	\$2,222,459.50 and expenses of \$659,745.97,		
6	are approved.		
7	FTI Consulting, Inc., fees of \$32,364,884.11 52	11	
8	and expenses of \$908,878.43, are approved.		
9	Hudson Cook, fees of \$2,284,737.50 and 52	13	
10	expenses of \$30,550.67, are approved.		
11	KPMG, LLP, fees in the amount of 52	15	
12	\$1,791,439.65 and expenses of \$102,515.04,		
13	are approved.		
14	Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, final fees 52	17	
15	of \$212,440.50 are approved.		
16	Locke Lord, LLP, fees of \$1,222,388.78 and 52	19	
17	expenses of \$22,716.90, are approved.		
18	Mercer (US) Inc., fees of \$311,434.94 and 52	21	
19	expenses of \$44,731.65, are approved.		
20	Morrison & Foerster, LLP, fees of 52	24	
21	\$95,457,127.80 and expenses of		
22	\$3,043,012.82, are approved.		
23	Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, fees 53	1	
24	In the amount of \$1,833,156.19 and expenses		
25	of \$4,749.95 are approved.		

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2	RULINGS			
3	Pa	age	Line	
4	Pepper Hamilton, LLP, fees of \$5,295,708.50	53	3	
5	and expenses of \$124,924.14 are approved.			
6	Prince Lobel Tye, LLP, fees in the amount	53	6	
7	of \$222,328 and expenses of \$29,451.34, are			
8	approved.			
9	Rubenstein Associates, Inc., fees of \$38,276	53	8	
10	and expenses of \$9,920.93, are approved.			
11	Severson & Werson, P.C., fees of	53	10	
12	\$3,321,340.39 and expenses of \$295,040.35,			
13	are approved.			
14	Tilghman & Co., P.C., fees of \$11,507.50 and	53	12	
15	expenses of \$29,046.14, are approved.			
16	Towers Watson Delaware, Inc., fees of	53	14	
17	\$175,665.92 and expenses of \$9,550.01, are			
18	approved.			
19	Troutman Sanders, LLP, fees of \$1,043,948.96	53	16	
20	and expenses of \$16,823.37, are approved.			
21	AlixPartners LLP, fees in the amount of	53	20	
22	\$14,718,273.53 and expenses of \$103,325.70,			
23	are approved.			
24	Analytic Focus, LLC, fees of \$592,840.25	53	22	
25	and expenses of \$355.29, are approved.			

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1			
2	RULINGS		
3	Page	Line	
4	Coherent Economics, LLC, fees in the amount 53	25	
5	of \$1,135,367.52 and expenses in the amount		
6	of \$15,194.52, are approved.		
7	J.F. Morrow, fees in the amount of \$250,060 54	5	
8	and expenses of \$1,345.61, are approved		
9	Kramer Levin fees in the amount of 54	7	
10	\$64,366,016.25 and expenses in the amount of		
11	\$2,416,309.04, are approved.		
12	Moelis & Co., LLC, fees in the amount of 54	20	
13	\$14,616,129.03 and expenses in the amount of		
14	\$249,664.42, are approved.		
15	Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, LLP, fees in 54	23	
16	the amount of \$4,843,989.47 and expenses in		
17	the amount of \$87,794.29, are approved.		
18	Quest Turnaround Advisors, LLC, fees in the 55	1	
19	amount of \$345,646.12 and expenses in the		
20	amount of \$17,614.09, are approved.		
21	San Marino Business Partners, LLC, fees in 55	4	
22	the amount of \$263,157.38 and expenses of		
23	\$11,404.30, are approved.		
24			
25			

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				194
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1				
2	RULINGS			
3	F	age	Line	
4	Leonard, Street and Deinard, Professional	55	12	
5	Association, fees in the amount of \$100,000			
6	and expenses in the amount of \$4,210, are			
7	approved.			
8	Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP,	55	16	
9	fees in the amount of \$82,997.85 and			
10	expenses of \$1,670.56, are approved.			
11	Curtis, Mallet fee application approved in	58	17	
12	the amount of \$9,847,770.80, and expenses			
13	of \$53,990.94.			
14	Perkins Coie fee application approved with	62	3	
15	Reduction of \$3,802.31 from the			
16	\$1,462,384.21 requested.			
17	Weir & Partners fees approved in amount	62	20	
18	of 2,349 dollars. Expense request should			
19	be resubmitted with more detail.			
20	SilvermanAcampora fee application approved	64	22	
21	with a reduction of 340 dollars.			
22	Wilmer Cutler fee application approved in	67	3	
23	amount of \$828,680.50 fees, expenses of			
24	\$3,713.58.			
25				

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1			
2	RULINGS		
3	Page	Line	
4	Fee application for Carter Ledyard & 75	10	
5	Milburn LLP approved as reduced on		
6	the record.		
7	Trust's objections to Chadbourne fee 120	9	
8	application overruled.		
9	Chadbourne application for fees and 122	13	
10	expenses granted with reductions:		
11	\$46,799,750.66 for fees and \$2,995,419.47		
12	for expenses Mesirow's final fee application		
13	is granted in part and denied in part		
14	Mesirow's fee request of 39,472,705 156	21	
15	dollars approved subject to a continued		
16	holdback of 500,000 dollars		
17	Examiner's final application is approved. 161	20	
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	eScribers, LLC   (973) 406-2250		